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RECONSIDERING SECTION 1983’S NONABROGATION OF 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Katherine Mims Crocker* 
Abstract 
Motivated by civil unrest and the police conduct that prompted it, 
Americans have embarked on a major reexamination of how 
constitutional enforcement works. One important component is 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, which allows civil suits against any “person” who violates federal 
rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that “person” excludes 
states because Section 1983 flunks a condition of crystal clarity.  
This Article reconsiders that conclusion—in legalese, Section 1983’s 
nonabrogation of sovereign immunity—along multiple dimensions. 
Beginning with a negative critique, this Article argues that because the 
Court invented the crystal-clarity standard so long after Section 1983’s 
enactment, the caselaw contravenes commonsense interpretive practice, 
works a methodological anomaly, and offends foundational democratic 
values. This Article also contends that the caselaw rests on inappropriate 
assumptions that members of Congress during Reconstruction thought 
about federalism the same way members of the Court a century later did.  
Turning to an affirmative critique, this Article explores Section 1983’s 
semantic meaning and expected applications. Among other things, this 
analysis uncovers evidence that some members of the public may have 
initially understood the statute to reach states—and that members of 
Congress inadvertently amended the default definition of “person” in 
1874. The upshot is that despite credible counterarguments, the best 
reading of Section 1983 may make states suable. 
Finally, this Article explores implications for reforming 
constitutional-tort law. In particular, it introduces the policy landscape 
and proposes a path forward with an initial focus on Fourth Amendment 
excessive force claims and a gradual extension to other contexts.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In its recent decision in Tanzin v. Tanvir,1 the participating members 
of the Supreme Court unanimously said that “[a]lthough background 
presumptions can inform the understanding of a word or phrase” in a 
statute, “those presumptions must exist at the time of enactment.”2 
Accordingly, the Court declared that “[w]e cannot manufacture a new 
presumption now and retroactively impose it on a Congress that acted 
[many] years ago.”3 
 
 1. 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020).  
 2. Id. at 493. Justice Amy Coney Barrett did not participate in this decision. 
 3. Id. 
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But that is exactly what the Court has done in construing a critical 
aspect of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a “most important, and ubiquitous, civil rights 
statute.”4 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for so-called 
constitutional-tort suits against every “person” who “subjects, or causes 
to be subjected” someone else “to the deprivation of [federal] rights, 
privileges, or immunities” while acting “under color of” state law.5 The 
Court has long held that the key word “person” does not include state 
governments. Instead, the Court has concluded, it includes only state and 
local officials and local governments.6  
The reason victims of constitutional-rights violations cannot sue state 
entities even when the government plainly bears fault, the Court says, is 
because Section 1983 flunks a condition of crystal clarity.7 That standard, 
however, was crafted in the mid-1970’s, more than a century after Section 
1983’s enactment in 1871.8 The Court has implicitly attempted to justify 
this retroactive approach by assuming that the Reconstruction Congress 
understood state sovereign immunity the same way the post-
Reconstruction Court did.9 Never mind that at the time of Section 1983’s 
passage, the so-called Dictionary Act provided that “the word ‘person’ 
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate,” which much 
evidence indicates may have included states.10 Never mind that the 
purpose of Section 1983 was to compel southern states to respect the civil 
rights of their recently freed Black citizens.11 
This Article asks how the Court’s refusal to allow plaintiffs to bring 
constitutional-tort suits against states themselves—in legalese, Section 
1983’s nonabrogation of sovereign immunity—comports with sound 
statutory interpretation principles and a fresh look at the historical 
evidence. This Article then asks how this analysis could relate to 
conversations about improving legal protections for constitutional rights, 
especially in relation to the mass movement for racial justice and police 
reform following the death of George Floyd and many similar injustices. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a brief overview of 
precedent setting out who qualifies as a potential defendant in Section 
1983 actions. Part II provides a negative critique of nonabrogation, 
contending that the Supreme Court’s caselaw fails to justify its 
proscription of Section 1983 suits against states. Specifically, this Part 
shows how applying the crystal-clarity standard retroactively to interpret 
 
 4. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). 
 6. See infra Part I. 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
 10. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. 
§ 1); see infra Part III.A. 
 11. See infra Part I. 
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Section 1983 contravenes commonsense interpretive practice, works a 
methodological anomaly, and offends foundational democratic values. 
This Part then contends that precedent in this area rests on anachronistic 
assumptions that members of Congress in 1871, the year Section 1983 
was adopted, thought about state sovereign immunity the same way 
members of the Court a century later did. As things stood when Congress 
transformed the relationship between the federal and state governments 
during Reconstruction, the Court had never said that citizens could not 
sue their own states on the basis of federal question jurisdiction in federal 
court. In fact, Chief Justice John Marshall had declared the opposite, and 
it was not until 1890 that the Court embraced the broader understanding 
of state sovereign immunity that still controls today. 
Part III presents an affirmative critique of nonabrogation, offering 
arguments (while recognizing counterarguments) for why one could view 
Section 1983 as allowing actions against states. This Part first explores 
the semantic meaning of the statute’s reference to “person[s],” examining 
in particular the Dictionary Act’s 1871 definition and 1874 amendment. 
This Part then considers Section 1983’s expected applications around the 
time of enactment, as demonstrated with respect to members of Congress 
by the statute’s legislative history and with respect to members of the 
public by its litigation history. This Part also touches on interpretive 
methodology more broadly, including the potential relevance of the 
Court’s recent decision establishing statutory protections against 
employment discrimination on account of sexual orientation and 
transgender identity. 
Part IV shifts the focus from the past to the future, briefly considering 
implications of reconsidering Section 1983’s nonabrogation of sovereign 
immunity for potential reforms to the constitutional-tort system. This Part 
begins by providing an introduction to the policy conditions in play. This 
Part then proposes a path forward that focuses on Fourth Amendment 
excessive force claims, which have been central to the recent popular and 
political interest in improving constitutional enforcement, while 
preserving opportunities to expand state-government liability to other 
kinds of unconstitutional conduct. 
I.  A DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW 
Section 1983 was originally enacted as Section 1 of a major piece of 
Reconstruction legislation known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871.12 Also 
 
 12. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1983) (“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, That any person who, under color of any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any 
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
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called the Ku Klux Klan Act, the legislation “was passed by a Congress 
that had the Klan ‘particularly in mind.’”13 Accordingly, “The debates are 
replete with references to the lawless conditions existing in the South in 
1871.”14 To quote one legislator: 
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while 
whippings and lynchings and banishment have been visited 
upon unoffending American citizens, the local 
administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to 
apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the 
night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of 
felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice. 
Immunity is given to crime, and the records of the public 
tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective 
redress.15 
As another congressman said: “[M]en were murdered, houses were 
burned, women were outraged, men were scourged, and officers of the 
law shot down; and the State made no successful effort to bring the guilty 
to punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and 
innocent.”16  
As these quotations demonstrate, while “one main scourge of the 
evil—perhaps the leading one” underlying the Act’s passage—was the 
Klan, “the remedy created was not a remedy against it or its members but 
against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or 
unwilling to enforce a state law.”17 Accordingly, the target of Section 
1983, like the target of the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment it was 
enacted to enforce, was state action.18 
 
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the state to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to 
the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such 
proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and 
subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases 
in such courts, under the provisions of the act of [April 9, 1866], entitled ‘An act to protect all 
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication’; 
and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such 
cases.”). 
 13. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (quoting J. G. RANDALL, THE CIVIL WAR 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 857 (1st ed. 1937)), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
436 U.S. 658 (1978).  
 14. Id. 
 15. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871) (statement of Rep. Lowe). 
 16. Id. at 428 (statement of Rep. Beatty). 
 17. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175–76 (emphasis omitted).  
 18. See id. at 176.  
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Modern constitutional-tort doctrine begins with the Court’s 1961 
decision in Monroe v. Pape,19 which reinvigorated Section 1983 after 
decades of relative dormancy.20 Monroe held that the language 
referencing conduct occurring “‘under color of’ enumerated state 
authority” reaches acts committed in the course of a state or local 
official’s employment even if state law made them illegal.21 Section 1983 
was intended, the Court said, not only to “override certain kinds of state 
laws,” but also to “provide[] a remedy where state law was inadequate” 
and “where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not 
available in practice.”22 
The Court quickly made clear, however, that sovereign immunity 
would preclude plaintiffs from using Section 1983 to sue states 
themselves. The Court first addressed the issue in the 1974 case Edelman 
v. Jordan.23 In Ex parte Young,24 the Court held that district courts could 
order state officials to conform their conduct to federal law, 
notwithstanding that state governments would end up shouldering the 
burden.25 The district court in Edelman had entered a Young-style 
injunction, but it also went further by directing the defendants—who 
were state officials—to pay the plaintiff class what the court of appeals 
characterized as “equitable restitution.”26 The question before the Justices 
was whether the latter ran afoul of the state’s sovereign immunity.27 The 
Court said yes, articulating a distinction between prospective equitable 
relief, which was permissible under Young, and retrospective relief, 
which was not.28 Edelman proceeded briefly to consider whether Section 
1983 abrogated (or withdrew) the state’s immunity protections, 
answering no.29  
In Quern v. Jordan,30 a 1979 “sequel” arising from the Edelman 
litigation, the Court reiterated that Section 1983 does not abrogate 
sovereign immunity.31 But questions concerning state suability persisted. 
Why? In theory, Quern concerned not whether a state was a “person” 
pursuant to Section 1983 simpliciter, but whether an affirmative answer 
 
 19. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 
(1978).  
 20. See id. at 171–72. 
 21. Id. at 172 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).  
 22. Id. at 173–74. 
 23. 415 U.S. 651, 675–77 (1974). 
 24. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  
 25. Id. at 149, 155–56. 
 26. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665. 
 27. Id. at 665–69. 
 28. Id. at 667–69. 
 29. Id. at 674–77. 
 30. 440 U.S. 332 (1979). 
 31. Id. at 333, 338–49. 
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was obvious enough to conclude that Congress meant to strip the states 
of immunity. The Court had established that Section 1983 actions were 
cognizable in both federal and state courts,32 but when Quern was 
decided, constitutionalized sovereign immunity protections did not 
extend into state tribunals.33 So some observers thought Quern left the 
door open to sue states in state courts.34 The Court rejected this notion a 
decade after Quern in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,35 
which came up through the Michigan judicial system.36 “[A] State is not 
a person” within the text of Section 1983, Will held, finally settling the 
status of states in the constitutional-tort scheme.37   
In sum, pursuant to Monroe, state and local officials qualify as 
“person[s]” under Section 1983. But pursuant to Edelman, Quern, and 
Will, states themselves do not. Importantly, Monroe also held that local 
governments were not “person[s],”38 but the Court overruled that 
conclusion in the 1978 case Monell v. Department of Social Services.39 
The bottom line, therefore, is that state and local employees and local 
entities are all suable defendants under Section 1983, while state entities 
are not. 
II.  A NEGATIVE CRITIQUE 
This Part examines how the Supreme Court has applied its sovereign 
immunity abrogation doctrine in the Section 1983 context, which turns 
out to be both anomalous and ahistorical. The upshot is that this caselaw 
disregards fundamental democratic values by holding a statute enacted in 
1871 and adopted to expand civil rights against states to a clear-statement 
standard articulated in the mid-1970s and rooted in post-Reconstruction 
attitudes about federalism.  
  
 
 32. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 147 (1988). 
 33. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980). Since then, the Court has held that 
constitutionalized state sovereign immunity does reach state courts. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019) (regarding suits against states in other states’ courts); Alden 
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (regarding suits against states in their own courts). 
 34. See, e.g., Karchefske v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 371 N.W.2d 876, 880 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1985) (“Not only are we persuaded that Quern does not hold that a state is not a § 1983 ‘person,’ 
but we find within the Quern opinion some evidence that the state in fact is such a person.”), 
vacated, 429 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1987). 
 35. 491 U.S. 58 (1989). 
 36. Id. at 63–64. 
 37. Id. at 64. 
 38. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191–92 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 39. 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). 
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A.  Preliminary Points 
A few preliminary points about state sovereign immunity should 
prove useful. The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial 
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”40 The Amendment was put into place shortly after and in response 
to the 1793 case Chisholm v. Georgia,41 in which the Supreme Court 
allowed a citizen of South Carolina to sue Georgia in federal court for a 
debt dating back to the Revolutionary War.42  
Initially, the Court appeared to interpret the Eleventh Amendment as 
limited to the circumstances it expressly addresses43—suits “in law or 
equity,” brought “against one of the United States,” and filed “by Citizens 
of another State” (or country).44 But since the 1890 case Hans v. 
Louisiana,45 a suit filed against a state by one of its own citizens,46 the 
Court “has repeatedly held” that the Constitution affords immunity 
protections “extend[ing] beyond the literal text of the Eleventh 
Amendment” and instead stemming from a broader historical model of 
sovereignty.47 
Law professors love to hate the Court’s caselaw on state sovereign 
immunity.48 As Professor John Jeffries has explained, many academics 
“assert[] that the Eleventh Amendment limits only diversity jurisdiction, 
that it has no application in federal question cases, and that in 
constitutionalizing some form of state sovereign immunity, the Supreme 
Court has been on the wrong track” since Hans.49 While the literature 
contains “rebuttals and contributions from other perspectives,” the 
 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 41. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI.  
 42. See id. at 420, 479.  
 43. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 907–08 (7th 
ed. 2015). 
 44.  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 45. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  
 46. Id. at 9. 
 47. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754 (2002); see Hess v. Port 
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 54 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that 
sovereign immunity arose “from the peculiarities of political life in feudal England” (citing 1 
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE 
THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 515–18 (2d ed. 1909)). 
 48. See Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7 (“The Court’s state sovereign immunity jurisprudence is frequently convoluted, 
contradictory, and obscure. It is, in other words, something only a law professor could love.”). 
 49. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 47, 48 (1998). 
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predominant position has long been that sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence is an “intellectual disaster.”50  
One important approach at odds in some respects with the prevailing 
view comes from the work of Professors Will Baude and Steve Sachs,51 
which in turn builds on research by scholars including Professors Brad 
Clark, Kurt Lash, and Caleb Nelson and now-Judge Steve Menashi.52 
Baude and Sachs argue that “[s]tates are protected by two forms of 
sovereign immunity.”53 One, which predates the Constitution, “is a 
common-law immunity . . . that prevents states from being forced into 
court without their consent.”54 This is a relatively broad but weak 
immunity, subject to waiver and perhaps abrogation under certain 
congressional powers.55 The other form of sovereign immunity comes 
from the Eleventh Amendment, which Baude and Sachs contend “limit[s] 
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts” in exactly the manner 
it says.56 This is a relatively narrow but strong immunity, subject to 
neither waiver nor abrogation.57 
Given the long-running controversy surrounding the basic sources and 
scope of state sovereign immunity, it bears emphasizing that the present 
project is largely agnostic (albeit somewhat skeptical) about whether the 
Court has been correct that the Eleventh Amendment evidences an 
expansive understanding of immunity protections incorporated into the 
Constitution itself. The analysis here has a different and more specific 
focus, homing in on Congress’s authority to abrogate states’ immunity 
and on how the Court has viewed that authority in the constitutional-tort 
context. For this project’s purposes, then, one can assume that Hans was 
right about original understandings, especially to the extent one reads 
Hans as potentially consistent with Baude and Sachs’s approach (a 
 
 50. Id. (footnote omitted).  
 51. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Misunderstood Eleventh Amendment, 169 
U. PA. L. REV. 609, 614 (2021); William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 
103 VA. L. REV. 1, 4–9 (2017); Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1813, 1868–75 (2012). 
 52. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 51, at 5 & nn.11–13 (citing Caleb Nelson, Sovereign 
Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559 (2002); Bradford R. 
Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1817 (2010); 
Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background 
Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577 (2009); Steven Menashi, Article 
III as a Constitutional Compromise: Modern Textualism and State Sovereign Immunity, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1135 (2009)).  
 53. Baude & Sachs, supra note 51, at 5. 
 54. Id.  
 55. See id. at 17 (waiver); id. at 36–37 (abrogation). 
 56. Id. at 4–5. 
 57. See id. at 17–18 (waiver); id. at 37 (abrogation). 
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possibility they promote), which is agnostic about abrogation under the 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.58  
The Court has held that abrogation requires two elements: first, that 
Congress “‘mak[e] its intention’” to subject states to suit “‘unmistakably 
clear’” by “enact[ing] ‘unequivocal statutory language,’” and second, 
that “some constitutional provision . . . allow[s] Congress” to do so.59 
Quern and Will say that Section 1983 fails this test at the first step—
respectively, because using the general term “person[s]” to denote 
potential defendants does not disclose an “unmistakably clear” decision 
to make states suable and because “person[s]” as a category does not 
include states at all.60 As the following discussion contends, however, the 
Court has failed to justify this logic for two important reasons. The first 
relates to retroactive reasoning, and the second, to anachronistic 
assumptions. 
B.  Retroactive Reasoning 
The precept that courts will read congressional legislation as 
abrogating state sovereign immunity only if it contains unequivocal 
language to that effect is what the literature calls a federalism clear-
statement rule. These canons of construction say that Congress “cannot 
intrude upon the usual balance of state and federal power” without 
including “a plain statement of legislative intent.”61 
As with other clear-statement rules, an important question about 
retroactivity arises here. To what extent is it appropriate for courts to 
apply this aspect of abrogation doctrine to statutes enacted before it was 
established? Three strands of discussion help answer this question in the 
context of Section 1983. The first concerns interpretive theory with 
regard to clear-statement rules at large. The second concerns the Supreme 
Court’s retroactive application of the clear-statement concept in 
abrogation decisions in general. The third concerns the Court’s reliance 
on the abrogation-related clear-statement rule in constitutional-tort cases 
in particular.  
 
 58.  See id. at 11 (arguing that “Hans can be read as an Article III case, rather than an 
Eleventh Amendment case”). 
 59. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000–01 (2020) (first alteration in original) (first 
quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989); and then quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996)). 
 60. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (stating that “§ 1983 does not explicitly 
and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States”); 
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (stating that “a State is not a 
‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983”); supra Part I. 
 61. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2025 (2009). 
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1.  Clear-Statement Rules 
The Supreme Court has cast its use of federalism clear-statement rules 
in constitutional terms.62 Consider Atascadero State Hospital v. 
Scanlon.63 There, the Court said the abrogation-related clear-statement 
rule came from the idea that “the Eleventh Amendment implicates the 
fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and 
the States.”64 The Court went on to declare that “our Eleventh 
Amendment doctrine is necessary to support the view of the federal 
system held by the Framers of the Constitution.”65 This view, the Court 
said, rested on the notion that “the States played a vital role in our system 
and that strong state governments were essential to serve as a 
‘counterpoise’ to the power of the Federal Government.”66 Indeed, the 
Court said, “none of the Framers questioned that the Constitution created 
a federal system with some authority expressly granted [to] the Federal 
Government and the remainder retained by the several States.”67  
Now-Dean John Manning presents a compelling case that the 
connections between federalism clear-statement rules on the one hand 
and the Constitution’s text, structure, and history on the other are too few 
and faint to support the Court’s characterization.68 As Manning explains, 
and as Atascadero exemplifies, the problem with this analysis is that the 
sheer existence of a federal system does not necessitate either broad-
based sovereign immunity or high-hurdle abrogation rules.69  
“Although certainly correct” that “the United States Constitution 
adopts a system of federalism, in which the states retain some attributes 
of sovereigns and cede others,” Manning explains, “the structural insight 
at that level of generality is hopelessly uninformative.”70 For just as “the 
Constitution embodies federalism,” Manning continues, it also 
“embodies the principles of personal privacy, private property, 
and . . . the separation of powers.”71 While “[e]ach assertion describes 
goals that the document’s drafters set out to achieve, . . . each also 
abstracts the purpose underlying specific constitutional provisions to an 
unhelpful level of generality, one that disregards the specification of 
 
 62. See id. at 2004, 2025–29. 
 63. 473 U.S. 234 (1985), superseded by statute in part, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d-7), as recognized in Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).  
 64. Id. at 238–40. 
 65. Id. at 239 n.2. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. 
 68. See Manning, supra note 61, at 2004–09. 
 69. See id. at 2058. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
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means by which its adopters sought to achieve such purposes.”72 The 
Court’s framing of the abrogation-related clear-statement rule thus rests 
on something of a non sequitur. 
That the Constitution itself does not mandate the clear-statement 
component of abrogation doctrine, however, does not necessarily make 
the requirement illegitimate. Sometimes defenders of clear-statement and 
related rules contend that they accurately reflect congressional intent.73 
But that rationale seems dubious in many instances.74 Somewhat related 
is the common suggestion that these doctrines improve the “interbranch 
dialogue” between the legislature and the judiciary.75 But other 
commentators call this a “legal fiction.”76 Many interpretative principles 
stem not from constitutional directives, but from commitments to 
substantive ideals, including “judicially identified constitutional 
value[s]” like “federalism, nonretroactivity, or the rule of law.”77 But the 
fact that clear-statement rules privilege some ideals over others makes 
them susceptible to criticism. A piece by Professors Bill Eskridge and 
Phil Frickey, for instance, argues that clear-statement rules “are 
particularly countermajoritarian, because they permit the Court to 
override probable congressional preferences in statutory interpretation in 
favor of norms and values favored by the Court.”78  
At the very least, clear-statement rules’ defenders argue that 
democracy comes out on top in the end because Congress can always 
rebut the underlying presumptions by using clear language to legislate in 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 405, 468–69 (1989) (asserting that the avoidance canon, under which courts construe statutes 
to avoid constitutional doubts if possible, “responds to Congress’ probable preference for 
validation over invalidation”). 
 74. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (as to the 
avoidance canon, observing that “it is by no means clear that a strained interpretation of a federal 
statute that avoids a constitutional question is any less a judicial intrusion than the judicial 
invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same statute”). 
 75. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental 
Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1584–
88 (2001); Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RSRV. 
L. REV. 581, 583 (1989) (“Once [rules of ‘strict construction’] have been long indulged, they 
acquire a sort of prescriptive validity, since the legislature presumably has them in mind when it 
chooses its language . . . .”). 
 76. Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Clear Statement Rules, 97 
WASH. U. L. REV. 351, 397 (2019). 
 77. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 
399 (2010). 
 78. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 638 (1992). 
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different directions.79 This should mean that when a clear-statement rule 
has already been articulated at the time of a congressional action, the case 
for employing the rule to interpret the statute is relatively (even if not 
absolutely) strong. In theory, legislators should have been aware of the 
rule and known how to avoid its consequences. Likewise, litigants should 
be quick to test its application in court, supplying congresspeople an 
opportunity to amend the statute as necessary within a reasonable period 
after its passage—and potentially before the previous membership and 
political milieu have entirely dissipated.  
The latter happened following Atascadero’s holding that Congress 
was not specific enough about whether the statute at issue abrogated state 
sovereign immunity. The statute was enacted in 1973; the plaintiff sued 
in 1979; the case was decided in 1985; and Congress amended the statute 
to provide expressly for suits against states in 1986.80 The Senate 
Conference Report said Atascadero had “misinterpreted congressional 
intent.”81 And a primary proponent of the original bill was on hand to 
describe the later amendment as removing “the court-made barrier to 
effectuating” the legislature’s initial desires.82 So the Court–Congress 
feedback loop that clear-statement rules are said to facilitate actually 
worked.  
By contrast, when a clear-statement rule has not already been 
articulated at the time of a congressional action, the case for using it starts 
to collapse, especially the further in time the litigation follows the 
legislation.83 Congresspeople could not have foreseen the impediment 
 
 79. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the 
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000) (arguing that “a narrow 
construction of a statute designed to avoid constitutional doubts can be overcome by legislative 
action to clarify that the broader reading was what Congress really wanted,” such that “[t]he 
avoidance canon . . . makes it harder—but still not impossible—for Congress to write statutes that 
intrude into areas of constitutional sensitivity”). 
 80. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 240 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing 
this history).  
 81. S. REP. NO. 99-388, at 27 (1986) (Conf. Rep.). 
 82. 132 CONG. REC. 28,623 (1986) (statement of Sen. Cranston).  
 83. For previous (often brief) observations about conceptual problems with applying clear-
statement rules retroactively, see, for example, William Burnham, Taming the Eleventh 
Amendment Without Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 40 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 931, 991–92 
(1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s retroactive imposition of the abrogation-related clear-
statement rule “undercut[s] . . . longstanding . . . reliance interests” held by Congress about its 
ability to withdraw state sovereign immunity); Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Essay, Against 
Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1594 (2014) (stating that evidence “suggests 
that the Supreme Court’s retroactive application of clear statement rules . . . may be particularly 
problematic from th[e] perspective” of “upset[ting] the legitimate reliance interests of lawmakers 
or citizens” (citing Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 
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they would have to navigate to put some objective into law. And by the 
time a plaintiff gets around to advocating or a court gets around to 
accepting a reading that runs counter to what a statute’s enactors may 
have wanted, both the legislators themselves and the political 
circumstances that supported their cause may have passed on. 
In this scenario, clear-statement rules based on substantive values can 
go from being arguably undemocratic to actually antidemocratic. The 
suggestion that a later Congress can simply change the statute if it 
disapproves of a court’s construction overlooks the realities of the 
legislative process.84 For “[t]here are a hundred ways in which a bill can 
 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 945 (2013)); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 
621, 683–84 (1990) (arguing that when “Congress enacts a statute against certain well-established 
background assumptions” and “[t]he Court then switches those assumptions and interprets 
Congress’ work product in ways that no one at the time would have, or perhaps even could have, 
intended,” “there is something of a ‘bait-and-switch’”; that “[b]ait-and-switch is an unfair con 
game in general”; and that “when the victim of the con game is Congress it may be 
unconstitutional as well”); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign 
Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 
1272–73 (1978) (arguing that “[b]ecause it is unrealistic to expect Congress always to have 
expressed directly its intent to impose suit on states, especially in statutes enacted prior to [the 
rule’s establishment], courts following such a clear statement rule would not find private causes 
of action even in instances in which ‘all the circumstances’ made clear that state suability was 
intended” and that “[w]hile the rule appears to be one of judicial restraint, it effectively gives 
courts a veto over congressional causes of action” (footnote omitted)); Erin Morrow Hawley, The 
Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution: Redefining the Meaning of Jurisdiction, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2027, 2062 (2015) (“[A]lthough clear statement rules are often justified because they 
facilitate legislative and judicial communication, the Court’s clear statement rule [that Congress 
must specify when a procedural requirement should be treated as jurisdictional] cannot be 
defended upon clarity grounds because it often applies retroactively, compromising the 
background expectations necessary for effective communication between Congress and the 
judiciary.”); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its 
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 567 (1992) (arguing that the abrogation-related clear-
statement rule “may prove particularly offensive as applied to statutes enacted . . . when prevailing 
Supreme Court decisions suggested that less positive indicia of congressional intent would be 
sufficient”); Brian G. Slocum, Overlooked Temporal Issues in Statutory Interpretation, 81 TEMP. 
L. REV. 635, 663–64, 667–69 (2008) (arguing that “courts should consider prospective-only 
application of new or modified interpretive rules,” including clear-statement rules, that “would 
require or allow courts to adopt a second-best statutory interpretation”); Amanda L. Tyler, 
Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1419–20, 1420 n.143 (2005) 
(arguing that “the often inconsistent application of canons undercuts th[e] objective” of 
“achieving predictability and continuity in the statutory regime” and that “[p]erhaps worst of all,” 
the Court has demonstrated “a fondness for creating new and quite powerful canons and applying 
them retroactively,” including in the abrogation-related clear-statement context). 
 84. See, e.g., Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of 
States, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1967 n.42 (1994) (“The difficulties associated with ‘retroactive’ 
applications of interpretive approaches might suggest that clear statement rules ought to be applied 
only to current legislation. It is unclear, however, why the inaccessibility of the enacting Congress 
would militate against the consistent application of a particular interpretive approach: the sitting 
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die even though there is no opposition to it”85—assuming someone 
introduces a bill in the first place. And the enacting Congress may have 
encountered a unique political moment to which its members wanted to 
respond in a specific and abiding way. Applying a clear-statement rule 
retroactively, and especially with a large time lag, can rob the previous 
legislature of its constitutional prerogative to do just that. 
The concrete importance of these abstract arguments depends on the 
extent to which courts actually apply clear-statement rules retroactively 
in real-life cases. The Supreme Court recently repudiated this practice. In 
Tanzin, the participating Justices unanimously stated that “[a]lthough 
background presumptions can inform the understanding of a word or 
phrase, those presumptions must exist at the time of enactment,” such that 
the Court “cannot manufacture a new presumption now and retroactively 
impose it on a Congress that acted [many] years ago.”86 But as the 
ensuing analysis shows, the Court has sometimes done just that, including 
in establishing Section 1983’s nonabrogation of sovereign immunity.  
2.  Abrogation Decisions 
With regard to abrogation, recall that the clear-statement rule is just 
the first part of a two-step framework. To withdraw sovereign immunity, 
Congress must also legislate under a constitutional provision 
empowering it to subject states to suit.87 Nowadays, any such authority 
almost always comes from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.88 
Section 5 says that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article”89 (with such 
provisions including the Due Process Clause, the basis for the Court’s 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights protections against the states90). The 
point of the analysis here is to show—by walking systematically through 
the relevant caselaw—that the Supreme Court appears never to have 
applied the abrogation-related clear-statement rule in a way that was both 
retroactive and dispositive when considering a statute deemed properly 
enacted under Section 5. The sole exception, and thus an important 
anomaly, involves cases concerning Section 1983.  
The most relevant decisions are ones where the Court held that statutes 
represented a valid exercise of Section 5 authority but that Congress 
failed to speak clearly enough to strip states of their immunity. In both of 
 
Congress is capable of reforming old statutes that it feels have been misconstrued, just as with 
more recent legislation.” (citation omitted)). 
 85. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 538 (1983). 
 86. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 493 (2020).  
 87. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
 88. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1003 (2020). 
 89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 90. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019). 
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these cases not concerning Section 1983, the provision in question was 
enacted after the seeds of the clear-statement rule sprouted in the 1973 
case Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare v. 
Department of Public Health & Welfare.91 There, the Court said that “[i]t 
would . . . be surprising . . . to infer that Congress deprived Missouri of 
her constitutional immunity without . . . indicating in some way by clear 
language that the constitutional immunity was swept away.”92 
Atascadero, the first of these cases, concerned the Rehabilitation Act,93 
which overcame two presidential vetoes and “was finally signed into law 
on September 26, 1973”94—more than five months after the Employees 
decision was published.95 And Dellmuth v. Muth,96 the second of these 
cases, centered around the Education of the Handicapped Act,97 which 
was enacted in 1970 but amended in assertedly relevant ways in 1975 and 
1986, along with a 1986 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act.98  
Even cases where the Court concluded that the clear-statement rule 
was satisfied (meaning that retroactive application would have been 
harmless) have almost always involved statutes that became effective 
after Employees was decided in 1973. Some held that statutes passed both 
parts of the two-step abrogation test. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.99 
 
 91. 411 U.S. 279 (1973). 
 92. Id. at 285. 
 93. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–
796l).  
 94. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 255 n.7 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting), superseded by statute in part, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7), as recognized 
in Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).  
 95. Justice Brennan contended that the Court could not realistically have expected Congress 
to respond to the “clear language” standard from Employees (let alone to the tweaks from the case 
at bar) in a bill that had already advanced so far through the legislative process. See id. Regardless, 
Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department—which predated 
Employees by nine years—should have provided legislators fair warning, as four Justices argued 
for a clear-statement approach there. See 377 U.S. 184, 198–99 (1964) (White, J., joined by 
Douglas, Harlan, & Stewart, JJ., dissenting), overruled by Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).  
 96. 491 U.S. 223 (1989).  
 97. Pub. L. No. 91-230, Title VI, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified as amended as the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482).  
 98. See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 228–30. Justice Brennan again objected to applying the clear-
statement rule on the ground that the Court “resort[ed] to an interpretative standard that Congress 
could have anticipated only with the aid of a particularly effective crystal ball.” Id. at 241 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). But rather than getting at retroactivity generally, he argued specifically 
that Employees and several successor cases indicated that “this Court would consider legislative 
history and make inferences from text and structure in determining whether Congress intended to 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. He criticized the Court for abandoning that pattern 
in favor of requiring more pointed statutory language. Id. at 241–42.  
 99. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled in part by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996). 
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involved the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980100 and the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986.101 Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs102 involved a family-care claim under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).103 Tennessee v. Lane104 concerned 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),105 enacted in 1990, 
as applied to claims for access to court buildings.106 United States v. 
Georgia107 also concerned Title II of the ADA, this time as applied to 
claims alleging cruel and unusual punishment in prison.108  
Other cases in the same bucket held that statutes passed the clear-
statement prong but failed the constitutional-authorization prong of the 
abrogation test. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida109 held that 
Congress could not withdraw state sovereign immunity when acting 
under the Commerce Clause110—or under any Article I power, according 
to a later case’s gloss on the decision.111 But Seminole Tribe first 
concluded that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,112 passed in 1988, 
included “an ‘unmistakably clear’ statement of [Congress’s] intent to 
abrogate.”113 Similarly, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank114 held that Congress exceeded 
its authority under Section 5 by attempting to abrogate sovereign 
immunity in the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy 
Clarification Act,115 which was enacted in 1992.116 But that was only after 
 
 100. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 101. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code); Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 5.  
 102. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 103. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. 
and 29 U.S.C.); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724. 
 104. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).  
 105. Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 201–246, 104 Stat. 327, 337–53 (1990) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165).  
 106. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513.  
 107. 546 U.S. 151 (2006).  
 108. Id. at 153, 155. 
 109. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 110. Id. at 47.  
 111. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 
(1999). But cf. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (holding that the 
Bankruptcy Clause, an Article I provision, itself abrogates state sovereign immunity). 
 112. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166–
1168 and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721).  
 113. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56. 
 114. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).  
 115. Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541, 
2570 and 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 296).  
 116. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 630–32. 
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concluding that Congress “made its intention to abrogate the States’ 
immunity ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”117  
Next came a pair of cases also holding that congressional attempts to 
subject states to suit were unsupportable under Section 5. But again, the 
decisions in both cases—Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents118 and Board 
of Trustees v. Garrett119—began by determining that Congress spoke 
clearly in trying to withdraw sovereign immunity.120 And again, both 
statutes—in Kimel, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967,121 which was amended in relevant part in 1974,122 and in Garrett, 
the ADA, which was enacted in 1990123—postdated Employees, where 
the Court articulated the clear-statement rule in 1973. 
This trend has continued more recently too. Coleman v. Court of 
Appeals124 held that Section 5 did not allow Congress to subject states to 
suit for FMLA self-care claims.125 But the same FMLA provisions the 
Court said reflected an “unmistakably clear” aim to abrogate immunity 
in Hibbs did likewise in Coleman.126 And in Allen v. Cooper,127 decided 
just last year, the Court held that Congress could not make states liable in 
copyright-infringement actions under either Article I or Section 5.128 But 
first it said that “[n]o one here disputes that Congress used clear enough 
language.”129  
In one instance, the Court applied the clear-statement rule 
retroactively to a valid exercise of Section 5 authority but found the rule 
satisfied, meaning that the post hoc approach did not affect the 
outcome.130 That case, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,131 came early in the 
abrogation line, before Atascadero tightened the requirement by stating 
that “Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself” (as opposed 
 
 117. Id. at 635 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)). 
 118. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).  
 119. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 120. Id. at 363–64; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73. 
 121. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634).  
 122. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 68, 73–74. 
 123. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360. 
 124. 566 U.S. 30 (2012). 
 125. Id. at 43–44. 
 126. Id. at 35–36 (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003)); see 
supra text accompanying note 103. 
 127. 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020). 
 128. Id. at 998–99, 1007. 
 129. Id. at 1001. 
 130. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447–50, 452–53, 456 (1976). 
 131. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
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to, say, in the legislative history).132 Fitzpatrick also involved recent 
legislation.133 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972134 
predated Employees but postdated Parden v. Terminal Railway of the 
Alabama State Docks Department,135 a 1964 case in which four Justices 
supported a clear-statement rule.136 All these factors likely minimized any 
attention the anomalous approach might otherwise have drawn. 
What is more, the assertion that the Court appears never to have 
retroactively applied the abrogation-related clear-statement rule in an 
outcome-dispositive way to a valid exercise of Section 5 authority 
accounts for Employees itself. The statute at issue there, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938,137 was enacted under the Commerce Clause rather 
than under Section 5,138 and the two sources of congressional power are 
different in relevant ways. As Employees explained, “It is not easy to infer 
that Congress in legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which has 
grown to vast proportions in its applications, desired silently to deprive 
the States of an immunity they have long enjoyed under another part of 
the Constitution.”139 That logic falls away where Congress acts under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which—unlike the Commerce Clause—is 
specifically directed at states.140 
The Court relied on exactly this reasoning in a footnote in the 1978 
case Hutto v. Finney.141 Hutto said the abrogation-related clear-statement 
rule was irrelevant in determining whether state parties were subject to a 
statute providing for litigation cost-shifting. “Just as a federal court may 
 
 132. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (emphasis added), 
superseded by statute in part, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, 
§ 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7), as recognized in Lane 
v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).  
 133. See 427 U.S. at 447–48. 
 134. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 135. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).  
 136. See id. at 198–99 (1964) (White, J., joined by Douglas, Harlan, & Stewart, JJ., 
dissenting). 
 137. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219). 
 138. Emps. of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 
U.S. 279, 282 (1973).  
 139. Id. at 285. In addition, the Fair Labor Standards Act was amended in an assertedly 
relevant way in 1966, see id., which was post-Parden. 
 140. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”), 
with id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); id. amend. XIV, § 5 “The Congress shall have 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 141. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
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treat a State like any other litigant when it assesses costs” as part of its 
“‘inherent authority,’” the Court said, “so also may Congress . . . have 
[a] . . . class of costs apply to the States, as it does to all other litigants, 
without expressly stating that it intends to abrogate the States’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.”142 But “[e]ven if we were not dealing with an 
item such as costs,” the Court continued, the clear-statement rule would 
not have applied.143 For while Employees involved “a statute rooted in 
Congress’ Art. I power,” Hutto involved “a statute enacted to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment,” which expressly “‘embod[ies] limitations on 
state authority.’”144  
It is important, therefore, that both Employees and what appears to be 
the only subsequent case where the clear-statement rule affected the 
outcome when applied retroactively, Welch v. Texas Department of 
Highways & Transportation,145 involved statutes enacted under the 
Commerce Clause rather than under Section 5. In Welch, the Court 
refused to allow the plaintiff to sue state defendants under the Jones 
Act,146 enacted in 1920, on the ground that “Congress has not expressed 
in unmistakable statutory language its intention to allow States to be sued 
in federal court.”147 Welch assumed a statute passed pursuant to the 
commerce power could abrogate sovereign immunity148—an assumption 
Seminole Tribe later held incorrect.149 But Welch quoted Employees to 
indicate that because the commerce power “has grown to vast proportions 
in its applications,” the case for requiring a clear statement of state 
suability was especially compelling.150 
A few additional cases are pertinent to considering the retroactive 
application of the abrogation-related clear-statement rule outside of the 
Section 1983 context. In Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income 
Maintenance,151 the Court held that Congress did not legislate with the 
requisite clarity in a bankruptcy provision enacted in 1978,152 five years 
after Employees came down. In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,153 
moreover, the plaintiffs argued that a statute extending federal-court 
 
 142. Id. at 696 (quoting Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 74 (1927)). 
 143. Id. at 698 n.31. 
 144. Id. (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)). 
 145. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). 
 146. Ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988 (1920) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 38 and scattered sections of 46 
U.S.C. as revised).  
 147. Welch, 483 U.S. at 475. 
 148. Id. at 475 & n.5. 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
 150. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478 (quoting Emps. of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t 
of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973)).  
 151. 492 U.S. 96 (1989) (plurality opinion).  
 152. Id. at 101. 
 153. 501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
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jurisdiction to federal question cases brought by “Indian tribe[s] or 
band[s]” irrespective of the amount in controversy allowed them to avoid 
state sovereign immunity.154 The Court disagreed, in part on the ground 
that the provision was not specific enough to make states suable.155 
Because the statute was enacted in 1966,156 seven years before Employees 
was decided in 1973, this reasoning was retroactive. But the Court 
recognized as much—and therefore also analyzed the issue under the 
operative law when the statute came into being, concluding that the 
abrogation argument still failed.157 Then, in Raygor v. Regents of 
University of Minnesota,158 the Court relied on Blatchford’s reasoning to 
hold that the generally worded federal supplemental-jurisdiction statute, 
enacted in 1990, did not allow federal-court adjudication of claims 
against states.159 
Finally, the Court expressed skepticism about viewing nineteenth-
century events through a clear-statement lens, albeit in a less direct way, 
in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board.160 In College Savings Bank, the majority criticized 
Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent for relying on the clear-statement rule to 
decline to treat Hans, which was decided in 1890,161 as an abrogation case 
(although the majority would have reached the same result for a different 
reason).162 The majority said Justice Breyer’s suggestion that the statute 
providing federal-court jurisdiction in Hans “did not expressly ‘purpor[t] 
to pierce state immunity’” was misguided because “[t]he so-called ‘clear 
statement rule’ was not even adumbrated until” Employees was decided 
in 1973.163 
In all the precedent inspected here, the Supreme Court never applied 
the abrogation-related clear-statement rule retroactively to refuse to 
recognize a congressional withdrawal of state sovereign immunity in a 
 
 154. Id. at 783 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1362). At the time, and unlike now, federal question 
cases normally had to meet a monetary threshold to secure federal-court jurisdiction. See Federal 
Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369.  
 155. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 786–88. 
 156. See id. at 787. 
 157. See id. at 787–88. Although the plaintiffs asked the Court to engage in this exercise, see 
id. at 787, that the majority did so is significant. The Justices who dissented, moreover, denied 
the clear-statement rule’s relevance both because they believed the rule “ill-conceived” and 
because it had been “adopted so recently.” Id. at 795 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 158. 534 U.S. 533 (2002). 
 159. Id. at 540–42. 
 160. 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
 161. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
 162. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 687 n.5. 
 163. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting id. at 700 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). In College 
Savings Bank, the Court held that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, enacted in 1992, was 
not a valid exercise of Section 5 authority and thus could not abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
See id. at 672–75. But it did not specifically address the clear-statement issue. See id. 
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statute supported by the prevailing understanding of Section 5. That 
brings the analysis to decisions involving Section 1983, where the Court 
has applied the abrogation-related clear-statement rule in just that way. 
3.  Constitutional-Tort Cases 
Recall that the Court initially considered whether Section 1983 
abrogated state sovereign immunity in Edelman, decided in 1974.164 But 
Edelman’s analysis was exceedingly brief, with the first meaningful look 
at how the clear-statement rule might apply in this context coming in 
Quern, decided in 1979.165 There, the majority proclaimed that it was 
“simply . . . unwilling to believe . . . that Congress intended by the 
general language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity 
of the States.”166  
Disagreeing in a separate opinion, Justice William Brennan Jr. 
focused on how Section 1983 was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which was expressly “‘directed to the States’” and 
“exemplifie[d] the ‘vast transformation’ worked on the structure of 
federalism in this Nation by the Civil War.”167 In light of the historical 
background and a general statutory definition of “person” in place when 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was adopted,168 Justice Brennan argued, “the 
face of the statute” was “plain enough” to articulate a cause of action 
against state defendants.169 
The majority invoked the clear-statement rule in response. “Our cases 
consistently have required a clearer showing of congressional purpose to 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity than our Brother Brennan is 
able to marshal,” the Court said.170 For Section 1983, the majority 
reasoned, “does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face 
an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States.”171 In tracing the 
clear-statement rule’s lineage, the earliest case to which Quern pointed 
was Employees.172 The Court never explained why it might have been 
proper to apply a substantive canon adopted in 1973 to a statute enacted 
in 1871, more than a century earlier. Nor did Justice Brennan press the 
matter, despite making a plea for “the present Congress . . . to rectify this 
 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 23–29. 
 165. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
 166. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). 
 167. Id. at 354–55 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (first quoting Ex parte Virginia, 
100 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1880); and then quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).  
 168. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 169. Quern, 440 U.S. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 170. Id. at 343 (majority opinion). 
 171. Id. at 345. 
 172. See id. at 343–45. 
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erroneous misinterpretation” and noting that “[t]he 42d Congress, of 
course, can no longer pronounce its meaning with unavoidable clarity.”173 
Quern shows exactly why filtering a statute through a substantive 
canon established so long after the legislation’s passage can have 
profoundly antidemocratic effects.174 Obviously, none of the 
congressmen who served in 1871 were around Washington, D.C., when 
Quern was decided in 1979 (or even when Employees was decided in 
1973) to help clarify and codify what they thought Section 1983 meant in 
light of the Court’s new interpretive approach. And the Reconstruction 
Congress—more than almost any other in American history—faced 
unique conditions and pursued unique objectives that its members wanted 
to shape the nation for generations to come. So it would have been 
unrealistic for the Court to expect that later legislators, with their own 
political realities and priorities, would adopt their postbellum 
predecessors’ anticipated provisions even if they agreed with them. 
Stated differently, had the Court refrained from employing the clear-
statement rule to interpret Section 1983 and held under an even-handed 
analysis that the 1871 statute abrogated state sovereign immunity, later 
Congresses would have faced an opt-out situation with regard to state 
suability rather than the opt-in situation that Quern put in place. 
Behavioral law-and-economics literature says enormous differences can 
flow from opt-out versus opt-in choices,175 in important part because 
decisional inertia can have powerful effects.176 And legislative-process 
theory says these differences are all the more consequential in the 
congressional context because of limited resources and facets like 
interest-group politics, agenda-setting prerogatives, and veto-gate 
prevalence.177 Factoring in vastly dissimilar background conditions at 
Time A, when an option comes into existence, and Time B, when some 
choice architect imposes a default rule, the prospect that selecting an opt-
in versus opt-out baseline will make little difference seems exceedingly 
small. So aside from fortuitously addressing state suability with extreme 
specificity, there was nothing Congress could have done in 1871 (or 
reasonably expected anyone else to do later) to effectuate an intent to hold 
states liable for constitutional violations. 
Will’s further ruling that Section 1983 does not include states within 
the word “person[s]” even beyond the abrogation context extended the 
 
 173. Id. at 365–66 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86. 
 175. See, e.g., Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. REV. 
1255, 1293–94 (2017) (“One study that compared rates of organ donation in opt-in countries with 
those in opt-out countries found that nearly 60 percentage points separated the two groups (the 
opt-ins versus the opt-outs).” (citing Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 
302 SCI. 1338, 1339 (2003))). 
 176. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17 (2013). 
 177. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 78, at 639–40. 
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flaws of the Court’s retroactive reasoning.178 Will said that requiring 
Congress to “make its intention . . . ‘unmistakably clear in the language 
of the statute’” was not just an abrogation-related doctrine, but was 
instead an “ordinary rule of statutory construction” applicable wherever 
the “usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal 
Government” was at stake.179 But none of the cases Will cited reached 
back anywhere near 1871.180 Most involved discussions confined to 
particular issues not involving the immunity-unrelated question whether 
a federal statute subjected states to suit.181 And the one that framed the 
rule as a general principle itself cited cases stretching back no further than 
the mid-twentieth century.182  
C.  Anachronistic Assumptions 
Related to but separable from its radically retroactive reasoning, as the 
following discussion details, the Supreme Court in Quern projected its 
current view of state sovereign immunity backward in time to say that 
when enacting Section 1983 in 1871, Congress knew that including states 
within the class of potential defendants would have transgressed usual 
structural constitutional limits. Accordingly, Quern reasoned, Congress 
would have made the desire to withdraw states’ immunity protections 
more manifest—meaning that it must not have wanted to do so in the first 
place.183 These assumptions were anachronistic and, like the Court’s 
handling of the clear-statement rule, had the effect of denying the 
Reconstruction Congress’s democratic authority.  
The discussion that follows explores the historical conditions 
confronting the congressmen who passed the 1871 Civil Rights Act and 
then examines some possible explanations for the Court’s muddled 
analysis. 
 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 31–37. For a somewhat similar argument from 
Professor William Burnham, the plaintiff’s attorney in Will, see William Burnham, “Beam Me 
Up, There’s No Intelligent Life Here”: A Dialogue on the Eleventh Amendment with Lawyers 
from Mars, 75 NEB. L. REV. 551, 568–72 (1996). 
 179. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State 
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). 
 180. See id. (collecting citations). 
 181. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987) (regarding conditioning federal 
grants); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 (regarding abrogating sovereign immunity); Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (regarding issuing Young-style injunctions to 
follow state law); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1981) 
(regarding conditioning federal grants); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) 
(regarding preempting police powers). 
 182. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 & n.16 (1971) (collecting citations). 
 183. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341–43 (1979). 
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1.  Historical Conditions 
The Eleventh Amendment responded precisely to the circumstances 
underlying Chisholm.184 The provision’s text makes clear that federal 
courts generally cannot decide cases (or at least cases premised on 
diversity jurisdiction, like Chisholm was) where citizens sue states that 
are not their own. But it makes clear little else. Multiple questions 
surrounding the Amendment and state sovereign immunity more 
generally—including “whether the Amendment barred a federal court 
suit against a state . . . by one of the state’s own citizens” asserting a 
federal question claim—thus remained “open . . . nearly until the end of 
the nineteenth century.”185 
The Supreme Court did not definitively answer whether states were 
subject to suits filed in federal court by their own citizens until 1890, 
when it said no in Hans.186 The delay makes sense. With the exception of 
a provision in place for a brief period between 1801 and 1802, Congress 
did not confer general federal question jurisdiction on federal courts until 
1875187—which was, of course, after it adopted Section 1983 in 1871. 
Before that jurisdictional grant, citizens would have found few occasions 
to try to sue their own states in federal court.  
Given all this, it seems quite possible that many members of Congress 
did not hold comprehensive views about sovereign immunity beyond the 
text of the Eleventh Amendment when enacting the Civil Rights Act of 
1871—including about how the doctrine might have applied to claims 
arising under Section 1. But to the extent that members of Congress did 
have well developed thoughts about what the Eleventh Amendment or 
sovereign immunity more generally entailed, it at least seems 
questionable to what degree they adhered to traditional notions of a 
state’s place vis-à-vis the federal government, especially insofar as 
individual rights were involved.188  
Creating general federal question jurisdiction, after all, was just “part 
of a larger substantive law and jurisdictional revolution that was an 
outgrowth of the Civil War and Reconstruction.”189 Michael Collins 
summarizes these legislative innovations as follows: 
 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 40–42. 
 185. FALLON ET AL., supra note 43, at 908. 
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 43–47. 
 187. Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 717, 720 & n.19 (1986). 
 188. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 
959, 1009 (1987) (“[T]he framers of the [Civil Rights Act of 1871] were far more concerned with 
achieving constitutional compliance than with respecting traditional notions of state 
sovereignty. . . . It is very unlikely, therefore, that they would have supported the recognition of 
the various immunities and shields from national intervention that litter the law of federal 
courts.”). 
 189. Collins, supra note 187, at 720. 
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Beginning in 1863, Congress greatly expanded the 
availability of the writ of habeas corpus by permitting 
defendants before or after trial to remove any state court civil 
or criminal action arising out of acts committed during the 
Civil War ‘by virtue or under color of’ any federal executive 
or legislative authority. Four years later, Congress permitted 
persons held under state authority ‘in violation of the 
Constitution’ or federal law to use the writ to challenge the 
constitutionality of their detention. The national legislature 
opened the doors of the federal courts at about the same time 
to state law actions in which litigants were denied or could 
not enforce statutorily guaranteed civil rights in state courts. 
During the further course of Reconstruction, Congress also 
created federal criminal sanctions and a variety of civil 
actions directly to vindicate newly created federal civil 
rights. Congress expanded removal on the basis of diversity 
of citizenship, and it enlarged the appellate jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court and jurisdiction over other specialized 
areas of federal law outside the field of civil rights.190 
While these contexts were all different, it seems sensible to suspect that 
at least some of the same legislators who passed these provisions could 
have believed that state sovereign immunity posed at most a common law 
barrier that Congress could overcome to a federal question suit against a 
state by one of its own citizens—or, again, that the matter remained up in 
the air.  
Importantly, as of 1871, the only high-court decision analyzing a suit 
against a citizen’s own state in light of the Eleventh Amendment had 
expressly held the provision’s protections inapplicable. In 1821, Cohens 
v. Virginia191 addressed whether what amounted to an appeal of a state 
criminal prosecution counted as a “suit in law or equity” against a state 
within the terms of the Amendment.192 The Court said no.193 But in an 
alternative holding, the Court—speaking through Chief Justice 
Marshall—said that “should we in this be mistaken, the error does not 
affect the case” at bar.194 For “[i]f this writ of error be a suit in the sense 
of the 11th amendment, it is not a suit commenced or prosecuted ‘by a 
citizen of another State, or by a citizen or subject of any foreign State.’”195 
 
 190. Id. at 720–22 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 
755, 756; and then quoting Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385). 
 191. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 192. Id. at 375–76, 405–12 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI). 
 193. Id. at 412. 
 194. Id.; see FALLON ET AL., supra note 43, at 907 & n.6 (calling this reasoning an 
“alternative holding” in relation to the conclusion that “[b]ecause the defendants’ petition for the 
writ of error was entirely defensive and sought no affirmative relief, . . . it was not a ‘suit’ within 
the meaning of the [Eleventh] Amendment”). 
 195. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 412. 
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Instead, the Court said, it “is governed entirely by the constitution as 
originally framed, and we have already seen, that in its origin, the judicial 
power was extended to all cases arising under the constitution or laws of 
the United States, without respect to parties.”196 This conclusion, 
moreover, aligned with the Marshall Court’s general view of the Eleventh 
Amendment as articulating a narrow exception to the scope of Article III 
jurisdiction.197 
The picture Quern painted failed to account for these historical 
conditions. “[N]either logic . . . nor the legislative history of the 1871 Act 
compels, or even warrants, . . . the conclusion that Congress intended by 
the general language of the Act to overturn the constitutionally 
guaranteed immunity of the several States,” the Court declared.198 “Given 
the importance of the States’ traditional sovereign immunity,” Quern 
said, “if in fact the Members of the 42d Congress believed that § 1 of the 
1871 Act overrode that immunity, surely there would have been lengthy 
debate on this point.”199 But “not one Member of Congress mentioned the 
Eleventh Amendment or the direct financial consequences to the States 
of enacting § 1” in the debates, the Court continued, concluding that “this 
silence on the matter is itself a significant indication of the legislative 
intent of § 1.”200  
This kind of reasoning assumed that the Congress of a century prior 
understood the Eleventh Amendment the same way the Court of the 
present did. But if there was no widespread and definitive belief that state 
sovereign immunity barred cases beyond the Amendment’s textual ambit 
in 1871 (and in particular suits against a plaintiff’s own state after 
Cohens), there would have been little cause to think congressmen would 
have felt compelled to use especially specific language to subject states 
to suit. The same would hold true if congressmen viewed state sovereign 
immunity outside of the Eleventh Amendment as a common law 
protection, which legislation could easily displace. And one cannot 
necessarily attribute much meaning to the absence of sovereign immunity 
references in the legislative record.201 “Congress may have been silent on 
 
 196.  Id. 
 197. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 43, at 907. 
 198. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979). 
 199. Id. at 343. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Justice Antonin Scalia made a related point in Welch. Expressing doubt about whether 
Article III incorporated “a nearly universal ‘understanding’ that the federal judicial power could 
not extend to [suits brought by individuals against States],” Justice Scalia argued that “for nearly 
a century” since the decision in Hans, Congress had acted with the assumption of pervasive state 
immunity. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496 (1987) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). “[I]f we were now to find that assumption 
to have been wrong,” Scalia concluded, “we could not, in reason, interpret [post-Hans] statutes as 
though the assumption never existed.” Id. 
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the subject” for many reasons, among them “because other parts of the 
bill”—which “included such invasions of state sovereignty as military 
takeovers of state and local governments and the suspension of the writ 
of habeas corpus for persons arrested by federal agents”—“were more 
controversial.”202 
Further undermining the Court’s abrogation-related logic is the 
possibility that legislators in 1871 thought the recently ratified Fourteenth 
Amendment—which Quern also brushed aside203—at least potentially 
resolved any sovereign immunity problems. The Court would go on to 
declare a few years later, in the 1879 case Ex parte Virginia,204 that 
because “[t]he prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to 
the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power,” 
congressional enforcement under Section 5 “is no invasion of State 
sovereignty.”205 It made no difference, the Court said, that “such 
legislation is restrictive of what the State might have done before the 
constitutional amendment was adopted.”206  
It would have been logical, therefore, for members of Congress in 
1871 to have adopted a posture toward state immunity protections that 
was quite different from the one Quern posited. In short, Reconstruction 
was an exceptional time in American political and constitutional life.  
Reconstruction radically reoriented the relationship between the federal 
government (including the federal court system) and state governments, 
especially when it came to the role of the former in defining and 
protecting citizens from civil rights abuses enabled by the latter. As 
Justice Harry Blackmun summed things up in a 1985 law review article: 
“Taken collectively, the Reconstruction Amendments, the Civil Rights 
Acts, and the[] new jurisdictional statutes, all emerging from the caldron 
of the War Between the States, marked a revolutionary shift in the 
relationship among individuals, the States, and the Federal 
Government.”207 The empirical question whether members of Congress 
actually took the position hypothesized here is explored below (as is the 
theoretical question to what extent the subjective intent of enacting 
 
 202. Burnham, supra note 83, at 993 n.259. 
 203. See Quern, 440 U.S. at 342 (stating that “the circumstances surrounding the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment” did not support abrogation). 
 204. 100 U.S. 339 (1879). 
 205. Id. at 346.  
 206. Id. 
 207. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will 
the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985); see also Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, 
and “Federal Courts,” 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 2044 (2003) (arguing that Hans’s reasoning was 
“rooted in a pre-Fourteenth Amendment view of the federal courts’ role, in the outmoded 
assumption that their primary purpose was to protect noncitizens and aliens, not a state’s own 
citizens”). 
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legislators should count in interpretation).208 What matters for present 
purposes is that the Court’s uncritical assumptions were not obviously 
correct. 
Again, the point is not that Hans was wrong, at least insofar as the 
logic there focused on historical understandings at the time of the 
founding and the Eleventh Amendment’s ratification. The point is instead 
that even if Hans was right about what people previously believed, 
understandings about state sovereign immunity—and especially about 
congressional abrogation—could have shifted in the decades afterward in 
light of factors like the Eleventh Amendment’s enigmatic text and 
judicial treatment or all the reforms flowing from the Civil War. Or 
people could have understood a background principle of state sovereign 
immunity as a common law concept all along.209 And the point is 
furthermore that regardless of what these possibilities might mean for 
constitutional construction, they are at least potentially relevant to what 
people might have thought about a statute enacted in the postbellum 
period. 
Will piggybacked on Quern here too. “Given that a principal purpose 
behind the enactment of § 1983 was to provide a federal forum for civil 
rights claims,” Will said, Quern’s holding that the statute preserved 
immunity protections in federal courts indicated that Congress did not 
subject states to suit in state courts either.210 In a footnote, the Court 
briefly acknowledged but entirely evaded the anachronism issue. 
“Petitioner argues that Congress would not have considered the Eleventh 
Amendment in enacting § 1983 because in 1871 this Court had not yet 
held that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal-question cases against 
States in federal court,” Will said.211 But “[t]his argument is no more than 
an attempt to have this Court reconsider Quern,” the majority declared, 
“which we decline to do.”212 
2.  Possible Explanations 
There are good reasons to suspect the Supreme Court understood the 
anachronistic nature of the narrative it told. Fitzpatrick, which came 
down in 1976, is particularly pertinent.213 Fitzpatrick established that 
Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant 
 
 208.  See infra Parts III.B.1 and III.C. 
 209.  See supra text accompanying notes 51–58. 
 210. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). 
 211. Id. at 67 n.6. 
 212. Id.; see William Burnham & Michael C. Fayz, The State as a “Non-Person” Under 
Section 1983: Some Comments on Will and Suggestions for the Future, 70 OR. L. REV. 1, 19 
(1991) (stating that Will did not “determine what the state of eleventh amendment immunity was 
in 1871”). 
 213. See supra text accompanying note 130–31. 
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to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and upheld the extension of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964214 to state governments through 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.215  
In Fitzpatrick, the Court waxed poetic about how the Fourteenth 
Amendment had long been understood to expand congressional power at 
the expense of state sovereignty. In addition to repeating the notion that 
enforcing the Amendment works “no invasion of State sovereignty,” the 
Court quoted Ex parte Virginia from 1880 for the proposition that “in 
exercising her rights,” a state can neither “disregard the limitations which 
the Federal Constitution has applied to her power” nor “deny to the 
general government the right to exercise all its granted powers, though 
they may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she would have if 
those powers had not been thus granted.”216 Ex parte Virginia and 
subsequent cases, the Court declared, left “no doubt” that the Constitution 
allowed “intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War 
Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of 
autonomy previously reserved to the States.”217 Abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity, the Court concluded, was part and parcel of this 
larger principle.218 
But in Quern, decided just three years later, the Court struck a 
decidedly different tone. What might explain the inconsistency? A couple 
doctrinal possibilities—which could dovetail with ideological, 
institutional, or other explanations—bear examining.  
As an initial matter, consider that then-Justice William Rehnquist 
wrote the majority opinions in both Fitzpatrick and Quern. An 
intervening case shows that Justice Rehnquist at first failed to appreciate 
the full implications of Fitzpatrick’s seemingly permissive approach to 
abrogation. Dissenting in Hutto,219 he wrote that while Fitzpatrick 
involved “a violation of the Equal Protection Clause which is contained 
in haec verba in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment itself,” the 
case at bar involved “the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, 
which is expressly prohibited by the Eighth but not by the Fourteenth 
 
 214. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17). 
 215. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447–48, 456 (1976). 
 216. Id. at 454–55 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)). 
 217. Id. at 455. 
 218. See id. at 456 (“[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state 
sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . We think that Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate 
legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for 
private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other 
contexts.” (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5)). 
 219. See supra text accompanying notes 141. 
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Amendment.”220 It was “not at all clear,” Justice Rehnquist said, “that 
Congress has the same enforcement power under § 5 with respect to a 
constitutional provision which has merely been judicially ‘incorporated’ 
into the Fourteenth Amendment that it has with respect to a provision 
which was placed in that Amendment by the drafters.”221  
Justice Rehnquist’s distinction between incorporated and innate 
Fourteenth Amendment rights never became part of constitutional-
enforcement doctrine. But Hutto hinted at Fitzpatrick’s expansive 
capacity, suggesting not only that congressional abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity could stretch into the constitutional-tort sphere 
(given that the fee dispute under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 derived from a Section 
1983 suit222), but that it could enfold the entire universe of claims found 
there. 
Given that he had “serious reservations” about extending Fitzpatrick’s 
reasoning beyond the due-process and equal-protection guarantees,223 
Justice Rehnquist must have been all the more concerned about extending 
Fitzpatrick’s reasoning to Quern’s circumstances. Quern involved 
Illinois’s withholding of benefits under a federal–state welfare 
program.224 As Edelman explained, the program was organized under the 
Social Security Act,225 which did not include a private cause of action, 
but the Court viewed Section 1983 as potentially providing an alternative 
path to relief.226 For as the Court would later reason, the fact that Section 
1983 supplies a cause of action for violations of “the Constitution and 
laws” of the United States means it can be construed to permit relief for 
federal constitutional and statutory claims.227 A holding that Section 
1983 abrogated state sovereign immunity in the context of Quern, 
therefore, could have opened up states to suit under all manner of 
congressional enactments. 
There is also a notable degree of path dependence underlying this line 
of precedent. Edelman (which Justice Rehnquist also wrote) was the first 
decision to say that Section 1983 could not support suits against states 
themselves. But the substance of that discussion boiled down to two 
sentences. First, the Court stated that “it has not heretofore been 
suggested that § 1983 was intended to create a waiver of a State’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action could be 
brought under that section against state officers, rather than against the 
 
 220. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 717 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 221. Id. at 717–18. 
 222. See id. at 693 (majority opinion). 
 223. Id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 224. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 333–34, 334 n.1 (1979). 
 225. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 226. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674–75 (1974) (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 
397 (1970)). 
 227. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
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State itself.”228 Second, the Court restated the general test for determining 
whether a remedy contravened sovereign immunity principles, implicitly 
rejecting the abrogation argument. Specifically, the Court said that 
“[t]hough a § 1983 action may be instituted by public aid recipients . . . , 
a federal court’s remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh 
Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and 
may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds 
from the state treasury.”229 
Edelman did not discuss whether states were “person[s]” within the 
meaning of Section 1983. It did not discuss the statute’s roots in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It did not even discuss the statute’s role in 
vindicating constitutional rights. Instead, Edelman focused at length on 
whether Illinois “had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and 
consented to the bringing of such a suit by participating in the [welfare] 
program.”230 Answering no, the Court said that “the threshold fact of 
congressional authorization to sue a class of defendants which literally 
includes States [was] wholly absent,” for the Social Security Act “by its 
terms did not authorize suit against anyone.”231 Only then did the Court 
briefly turn to Section 1983.232 
Given this disposition, the Court in Quern framed the abrogation issue 
as whether subsequent decisions “cast . . . doubt on our holding in 
Edelman,” as whether anything could “justify a conclusion different from 
that which we reached in Edelman,” and as whether a “reaffirmance of 
Edelman” was in order.233 Edelman’s idiosyncratic and essentially 
unreasoned discussion of Section 1983 thus allowed Quern to start from 
a strong presumption that immunity protections would persist, 
notwithstanding that Fitzpatrick had significantly elevated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s importance to abrogation doctrine in the interim. By 
reifying a decision that rested on air, Quern cut consideration of whether 
Section 1983 withdrew states’ immunity off at the knees. And in an 
apparent effort to avoid allowing any daylight between Section 1983 suits 
in federal and state courts, Will perpetuated the path-dependency problem 
by straining to pack the entire universe of sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence into Section 1983’s one-word reference to “person[s].”234 
 
 228. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 675–77. 
 229. Id. at 677 (citation omitted); see supra text accompanying notes 26–28. 
 230. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 671. 
 231. Id. at 672, 674. 
 232. See id. at 674. 
 233. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338, 341, 345 (1979). 
 234. See Burnham, supra note 178, at 569–71; Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of 
Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 96 n.183 (1990) 
(stating that “[t]he presumption relied on in Will . . . extends the (arguably) countermajoritarian 
effect of the clear evidence presumption of eleventh amendment cases”). 
32
Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol73/iss3/2
2021] RECONSIDERING SECTION 1983’S NONABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 555 
 
In sum, a careful reflection on Section 1983 sovereign immunity 
decisions reveals that the Court’s refusal to view states as cognizable 
defendants rests on retroactive reasoning and anachronistic assumptions 
that are faulty as a matter of interpretive logic and constitutional 
history.235 
III.  AN AFFIRMATIVE CRITIQUE 
So far, the analysis has aimed at examining shortcomings in the 
Supreme Court’s Section 1983 abrogation jurisprudence. The discussion 
has been negative in the sense that it picks apart the reasoning on which 
the Court has relied. But where does that leave things?  
The preceding negative critique calls for a corresponding affirmative 
critique asking how an interpreter should have approached the issue of 
Section 1983 actions against states from the start. “[P]erhaps” the Court’s 
rejection of state suability, while unconvincing as currently constructed, 
could “be made” convincing when rebuilt on some alternate foundation, 
to quote Will Baude’s recent study of the related doctrine of qualified 
 
 235.  As a response to both these conclusions, one could ask whether the concept of 
congressional abrogation and the clear-statement rule to overcome it arose in tandem around the 
time the Court decided Parden and Employees in 1964 and 1973, respectively. But if abrogation 
is a constitutionally permissible possibility, it should not necessarily matter when commentators 
or courts started writing about it. In any event, even a prominent abrogation skeptic acknowledges 
based on exhaustive historical research into congressional attitudes about abrogation during 
Reconstruction that “[p]robably some Republicans thought, or would have thought if they had 
thought about it, that Congress could create causes of action against nonconsenting states.” John 
Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity and Congress’s Enforcement Powers, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 
353, 388. And there is at least one early post-Hans instance of a court discussing the possibility 
of “abrogat[ion]” in what appears to be the context in question here. See Brown Univ. v. Rhode 
Island Coll. of Agric. & Mech. Arts, 56 F. 55, 58 (C.C.D.R.I. 1893) (“I shall assume, as contended 
by the respondents, that this action may not be maintained if it be, in substance, against the state. 
This proposition does not seem to me in any degree to depend on the allegation of ‘sovereignty’ 
in a state, in the strict sense of that word. Sovereignty is an indivisible, inherent attribute, incapable 
of any derogation by law, and doubtless involving an immunity from suits or legal proceedings 
of any sort. But under the constitution, as originally adopted, a state might be sued by a citizen of 
another state, and the eleventh article of amendment does not prohibit a suit by a foreign sovereign 
or state against a state of the Union; and it seems that such a suit might now be maintained. So, 
too, it is undoubted that a state may now be sued by another state; and, if it be said that the 
necessary consent to be sued was involved in the act ratifying the constitution, it may be replied 
that without the consent of some certain state the eleventh amendment may now be abrogated, 
and the judicial power of the nation may be restored as it was in the beginning, and still further 
extended; so that in this respect, as indeed in most, if not all, other respects, the supposed 
sovereign is in point of fact subject to a power superior to itself, and covering and including its 
whole territory. It may, however, be taken as the general law of the land that suits by private 
persons against a state may not be maintained. Into the origin and reason of this rule it is not 
necessary, for the present purpose, to inquire.” (citations omitted)). 
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immunity.236 Or perhaps the best interpretation of Section 1983 would 
abrogate sovereign immunity after all. And any real-world 
reconsideration of state suability in constitutional-tort suits would, to 
quote Baude again, “explicitly foreground” critical “policy” questions 
about whether sovereign immunity in this context “is wise or useful and 
about how it interacts with other aspects of our legal regime.”237  
Accordingly, this Part presents an affirmative critique of whether 
Section 1983 should have been read to abrogate sovereign immunity 
more or less from first principles. The purpose is not to advocate any 
overarching school of statutory interpretation—but rather to present 
evidence that may bear on state suability under different methodological 
approaches to greater or lesser degrees. This Part first considers Section 
1983’s semantic meaning at the time of its enactment and then explores 
its expected applications, both for members of Congress as indicated by 
the statute’s legislative history and for members of the public as indicated 
 
 236. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 78–79 
(2018) (remarking that “it is possible that the Court could put forward an entirely new legal 
argument for qualified immunity,” such that “perhaps qualified immunity doctrine c[ould] be 
made lawful”). 
 237. Id. Previous scholarship has focused on the policy side of this issue, asking whether 
states should be subject to civil accountability for constitutional violations as a normative matter. 
See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 100–21 (1983). Work examining this issue 
based on a close look at the text and history of Section 1983 seems sparser. Perhaps the most 
thorough example presents a point-by-point critique of the Will majority opinion by Professor 
Burnham and another lawyer who worked on that case. See Burnham & Fayz, supra note 212, at 
10–33. Other work includes shorter or narrower treatments of such issues, including several 
discussed here. See, e.g., Englander, John, Note, Amenability of States to Section 1983 Suits, 62 
B.U. L. REV. 731, 754–59 (1982) (relying on the purposes of the Reconstruction Amendments, 
the purposes and legislative history of Section 1983, the Dictionary Act, and statements in Monell 
and Quern to argue that states should be considered “persons” under Section 1983); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the 
Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 447 n.166 (1990) (stating that “[t]he legislative history of 
§ 1983, as well as the plain language and understanding underlying the Dictionary Act of 
1871 . . . demonstrate Congress . . . had the states’ interest in mind when Congress decided to 
subject the states to damage actions in federal court through § 1983” and that “[t]he history of 
Reconstruction . . . demonstrates that Congress held the states responsible for the violence in 1871 
against the newly freed slaves and their supporters and, therefore, made the states the primary 
target of § 1983”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and 
Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 561–62 (1989) (similar); 
John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State 
Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 
1413, 1464–68 (1975) (concluding on the basis of legislative history that “section 1983 was not 
intended to create private causes of action against state governments”); Gene R. Shreve, 
Symmetries of Access in Civil Rights Litigation: Politics, Pragmatism and Will, 66 IND. L.J. 1, 18 
& n.98 (1990) (briefly contending that “[b]oth sides in Will clothed their arguments in 
intentionalist language, yet as in Quern, neither side could muster convincing evidence about what 
Congress intended for section 1983 in damage actions” and stating that “[i]t seems doubtful 
whether adequate evidence exists”). 
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by its litigation history. The subsequent Part then focuses on the policy 
side of the question.  
A.  Semantic Meaning 
As the Supreme Court recently stated, “In the absence of an express 
statutory definition, the Court applies a ‘longstanding interpretive 
presumption that “person” does not include the sovereign.’”238 This 
presumption purportedly comports with the directive of the present-day 
Dictionary Act, which provides that “the word ‘“person” . . . include[s] 
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and 
joint stock companies, as well as individuals.’”239 By negative 
implication, the Court says, this definition does not include governments 
themselves.240 
Like most presumptions, this one is rebuttable.241 The Dictionary Act 
provides that its definitions control “[i]n determining the meaning of any 
Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise.”242 And the 
Court “normally interprets a statute in accord with the ordinary public 
meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment.”243 As the Court 
explained last year, this task requires the Justices to “orient [them]selves 
to the time of the statute’s adoption . . . and begin by examining the key 
statutory terms.”244 The analysis here considers evidence consistent with 
that general approach and then discusses how a range of interpretive 
philosophies might apply to the issue of state suability under Section 
1983. 
 
 238. Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1861–62 (2019) (quoting Vt. 
Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780–81 (2000)). 
 239. Id. at 1862 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1). Of note, the Dictionary Act 
included the same definition of “person” when the Court decided Edelman, Quern, and Will. See 
Michael J. Gerardi, Note, The “Person” at Federal Law: A Framework and a RICO Test Suite, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2239, 2251 (2009) (“Congress restyled the language . . . in 1948 into the 
modern definition: ‘[U]nless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words “person” and 
“whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint 
stock companies, as well as individuals . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting Act of June 25, 
1948, ch. 645, § 6, 62 Stat. 683, 859 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1))). 
 240. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947) (“The absence of 
any comparable provision extending the term to sovereign governments implies that Congress did 
not desire the term to extend to them.”). 
 241. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1941) (“Since, in common 
usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are 
ordinarily construed to exclude it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion.” (footnote 
omitted)), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 15a, as recognized in U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo 
Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736 (2004).  
 242. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). 
 243. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020). 
 244. Id. at 1738–39. 
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1.  The Dictionary Act’s 1871 Definition 
With respect to Section 1983, the time of the statute’s adoption was 
Reconstruction, and the key statutory term for present purposes is 
“person.” When the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted, the Dictionary 
Act (in its very first iteration) defined “person” differently from how it 
does today, specifying that the word could “extend and be applied to 
bodies politic and corporate . . . unless the context shows that such words 
were intended to be used in a more limited sense.”245 Congress adopted 
this definition on February 25, 1871, less than two months before it 
adopted Section 1983 in April.246 So absent some contraindication, the 
“person[s]” to whom Section 1983 referred would have included “bodies 
politic and corporate.” The questions become, therefore, first, whether 
some contraindication surrounding Section 1983 existed and second, 
whether states fell within the class of “bodies politic and corporate.” 
As for the initial question, assuming for the moment that “bodies 
politic and corporate” would have included states, at least three semantic 
possibilities indicating that Section 1983 may have encoded a narrower 
meaning of “person” are apparent.247 First, in both Quern and Will, the 
majority suggested that the 1871 Dictionary Act definition was 
unilluminating because it postdated the use of “person” in Section 2 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,248 which served as a model for the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871.249 But the earlier statute used “person” to delineate 
the target of criminal sanctions,250 and there appears to have been little if 
 
 245. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. 
§ 1) (emphasis added). 
 246. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 355–56 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 247.  To dispose of an additional potential contraindication off the bat, the fact that Section 
1983 targets violations of “the Constitution and laws” of the United States should not cause one 
to think the statute initially excluded states from its coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). 
For “[a]s originally enacted in 1871, the provision that is now § 1983 created a cause of action 
only for the deprivation of constitutional rights.” FALLON ET AL., supra note 43, at 1009; see supra 
note 12. As it turns out, “[t]he phrase ‘and laws’ was added, without helpful explanation, as part 
of a revision of the statutes in 1874.” Id. 
 248. Ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1443).  
 249. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989); Quern, 440 U.S. at 341 
n.11. 
 250. § 2, 14 Stat., at 27 (“[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or 
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different 
punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any time been held in a 
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the 
punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall 
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any doubt even then that states could not commit crimes.251 It would have 
been immediately clear from the subject matter, therefore, that a state 
could not have counted as a “person.” That was not true of the later 
statute, which used “person” to delineate the target of civil sanctions, so 
the subject matter said far less about whether a state could count as a 
“person.”252  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found cause to interpret 
statutes differently from prior statutes on which they were modeled.253 
Monroe provides an especially pertinent example, for there the Court 
concluded that provisions flowing from the 1866 Act and the 1871 Act 
encoded separate state-of-mind requirements in part because of their 
respective criminal and civil subject matters.254 Also relevant is a recent 
case ascribing “person” divergent meanings. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. 
European Community,255 the Court rejected the argument that because 
the private right of action provided by the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)256 “was modeled after § 4 of the 
Clayton Act, which we have held allows recovery for injuries suffered 
abroad as a result of antitrust violations,” RICO—in a provision 
“allow[ing] ‘[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of 
 
be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, 
or both, in the discretion of the court.” (emphases added)). 
 251. See Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 463 (2009) 
(discussing this understanding among Reconstruction congressmen). 
 252. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 43, at 907–08 (discussing how “[t]he Marshall Court 
generally construed the Eleventh Amendment narrowly” and how important “open questions 
about the Eleventh Amendment” existed “nearly until the end of the nineteenth century”). 
 253. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 n.2 (2009) (rejecting the 
argument that “the Court must incorporate its past interpretations of Title VII [of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964] into the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)] because ‘the substantive 
provisions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII’ and because the Court has 
frequently applied its interpretations of Title VII to the ADEA” (quoting id. at 183 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)); id. (reasoning that “the Court’s approach to interpreting the ADEA in light of Title 
VII has not been uniform” and that “[i]n this instance, . . . textual differences between Title VII 
and the ADEA . . . prevent us from applying [Title VII precedent] to federal age discrimination 
claims”). 
 254. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (“In Screws [v. United States] we dealt 
with a statute that imposed criminal penalties for acts ‘wilfully’ done. We construed that word in 
its setting to mean the doing of an act with ‘a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right.’” 
(quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945))), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); id. (“We do not think that gloss should be placed on [Section 
1983] which we have here. The word ‘wilfully’ does not appear in [Section 1983]. Moreover, 
[Section 1983] provides a civil remedy, while in the Screws case we dealt with a criminal law 
challenged on the ground of vagueness. Section [1983] should be read against the background of 
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.”). 
 255.  136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
 256.  Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968). 
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a violation of [a specific section] to sue in federal district court”257—must 
have allowed suits for injuries suffered abroad too.258 The Court 
explained that its holding about the Clayton Act259 “relied first and 
foremost on the fact that the Clayton Act’s definition of ‘person’—which 
in turn defines who may sue under that Act—‘explicitly includes 
“corporations and associations existing under or authorized by . . . the 
laws of any foreign country.”’”260 RICO, the Court said, “lacks the 
language” previously “found critical,”261 notwithstanding (as a separate 
opinion pointed out) that “RICO’s definition of ‘persons’ is hardly 
confining: ‘any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or 
beneficial interest in property.’”262 
A second issue concerns the appearance of the phrase “under color of 
state [law]” within the same sentence as the word “person” in Section 
1983. As the majority put the point in Will, “if a State is a ‘person’ within 
the meaning of § 1983, the section is to be read as saying that ‘every 
person, including a State, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects . . . .’”263 This, the Court said, “would be a decidedly 
awkward way of expressing an intent to subject the States to liability.”264 
But to quote Justice Brennan’s response, Section 1983 extends not only 
to states, but “as well to natural persons, who do not necessarily” act 
under color of state law.265 “[T]o ensure that they would be liable only 
when they did so,” Justice Brennan continued, “the statute needed the 
under-color-of-law requirement.”266 In other words, the choice to use 
“person” to include states was concise, not cumbersome.267 
A third related issue involves the reoccurrence of “person” later in the 
same sentence under examination here. Recall that Section 1 of the Civil 
 
 257.  RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2097 (second alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1964(c)). 
 258. Id. at 2109 (citation omitted). 
 259.  Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 and 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 52–53). 
 260.  RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2109–10 (third alteration in original) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313 (1978)). 
 261.  Id. at 2110. 
 262.  Id. at 2114 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 263. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (alteration in original) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 266.  Id.  
 267. See id. (“The only way to remove the redundancy that the Court sees would have been 
to eliminate the catchall phrase ‘person’ altogether, and separately describe each category of 
possible defendants and the circumstances under which they might be liable. I cannot think of a 
situation not involving the Eleventh Amendment, however, in which we have imposed such an 
unforgiving drafting requirement on Congress.”). 
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Rights Act of 1871 provided for civil suit against “any person” acting 
under color of state law who violated the constitutional rights of “any 
person” in the United States.268 One could argue that the latter reference 
to “person[s]” embraces individuals only,269 such that the consistent-
usage canon—that is, the presumption “that Congress uses the same 
words or phrases consistently across different parts of the same 
statute”270—means the former reference does too. But even assuming the 
premise, the conclusion does not necessarily follow. For the consistent-
usage canon states a relatively weak presumption and seems relatively 
weak as a descriptive matter.271 Moreover, there is little reason to think 
the latter appearance of “person” provided a better indication of what the 
former appearance of “person” meant than the actual statutory definition 
of that term did. 
As for the next question outlined above (whether states counted as 
“bodies politic and corporate” when Section 1983 was enacted), the 
historical record suggests that the phrase was somewhat ambiguous but 
would probably have been widely understood to include states. In Quern, 
Justice Brennan argued that the 1871 Dictionary Act supported state 
suability under Section 1983, providing bare citations to thirteen judicial 
opinions coming mostly from the Supreme Court and clustered largely 
within a few decades of Section 1983’s enactment.272 Reviewing these 
opinions shows they all indeed refer to states as “bodies politic” and/or 
“corporate”—or describe them using language that seems functionally 
equivalent.273 In Quern, Justice Brennan also cited the Preamble to the 
 
 268. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983) (emphases added); see supra note 12. 
 269. See Municipality of San Sebastian v. Puerto Rico, 89 F. Supp. 3d 266, 276 (D.P.R.) 
(explaining that “[s]ince Monell, the courts of appeals have been divided as to whether a 
municipality is a proper section 1983 plaintiff” and collecting citations), on reconsideration in 
part, 116 F. Supp. 3d 49 (D.P.R. 2015). 
 270. John F. Manning, Essay, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1938 
(2015). 
 271. See Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (“Most 
words have different shades of meaning and consequently may be variously construed, not only 
when they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even 
in the same section. Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used in 
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. But the presumption is not 
rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are 
used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act 
with different intent.” (citation omitted)). 
 272. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 356–57 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 273. See Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 188 (1915) (“The basic principle of the decision of 
the Court of Appeals was that the State is a recognized unit and those who are not citizens of it 
are not members of it. Thus recognized it is a body corporate and, like any other body corporate, 
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Massachusetts Constitution and the writings of Justice James Wilson,274 
 
it may enter into contracts and hold and dispose of property.” (quotation mark omitted)); 
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 24 (1892) (“The manner of the appointment of electors directed 
by the act of Michigan is the election of an elector and an alternate elector in each of the twelve 
Congressional districts into which the State of Michigan is divided, and of an elector and an 
alternate elector at large in each of two districts defined by the act. It is insisted that it was not 
competent for the legislature to direct this manner of appointment because the State is to appoint 
as a body politic and corporate, and so must act as a unit and cannot delegate the authority to 
subdivisions created for the purpose . . . .”); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288 (1885) 
(“The State is a political corporate body, can act only through agents, and can command only by 
laws.”); Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1878) (“The political society which in 1796 became 
a State of the Union, by the name of the State of Tennessee, is the same which is now represented 
as one of those States in the Congress of the United States. Not only is it the same body politic 
now, but it has always been the same.”); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) (in discussing 
states’ powers, stating that “‘[a] body politic,’ as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution 
of Massachusetts, ‘is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, 
and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common 
good’”); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50, 76–77 (1867) (calling a state “an organized political 
body” and discussing its “corporate existence”); Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 
231 (1850) (“Every sovereign State is of necessity a body politic, or artificial person, and as such 
capable of making contracts and holding property, both real and personal.”); Butler v. 
Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 416 (1850) (“[Contracts] are clearly distinguishable from 
measures or engagements adopted or undertaken by the body politic or State government for the 
benefit of all, and from the necessity of the case, and according to universal understanding, to be 
varied or discontinued as the public good shall require.”); id. at 416–17 (“[I]n every perfect or 
competent government, there must exist a general power to enact and to repeal laws; and to create, 
and change or discontinue, the agents designated for the execution of those laws. Such a power is 
indispensable for the preservation of the body politic, and for the safety of the individuals of the 
community. It is true, that this power, or the extent of its exercise, may be controlled by the higher 
organic law or constitution of the State . . . .”); Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 
93 (1795) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“A distinction was taken at the bar between a State and the 
people of the State. It is a distinction I am not capable of comprehending. By a State forming a 
Republic (speaking of it as a moral person) I do not mean the Legislature of the State, the 
Executive of the State, or the Judiciary, but all the citizens which compose that State, and are, if 
I may so express myself, integral parts of it; all together forming a body politic.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall). 419, 447 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“Any 
body politic (sole or aggregate) whether its power be restricted or transcendant, is . . . ‘a 
corporation.’ . . . In this extensive sense, not only each State singly, but even the United States 
may without impropriety be termed ‘corporations.’”), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
U.S. CONST. amend. XI; id. at 468 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (“[A]ll States whatever are 
corporations or bodies politic.”); Utah State Bldg. Comm’n v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 140 P.2d 
763, 766 (Utah 1943) (collecting definitions of “body politic,” “body corporate,” and “body 
corporate and politic” indicating that “the state” and other public entities could qualify); Comm’rs 
of Hamilton Cnty. v. Noyes, 5 Ohio Dec. Reprint 238, 240 (Super. Ct. 1874) (“In this state, we 
have but two classes of political corporations, the state of Ohio constituting the one and municipal 
corporations the other.”), aff’d sub nom. Comm’r of Hamilton Cnty. v. Noyes, 5 Ohio Dec. 
Reprint 281 (Super. Ct. 1875), aff’d sub nom. Bd. of Comm’rs of Hamilton Cnty. v. Noyes, 35 
Ohio St. 201 (1878). 
 274. Quern, 440 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).  
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which characterize states in the same manner.275 And Justice Brennan 
noted that “during the very debates surrounding the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act [of 1871], States were referred to as bodies politic and 
corporate.”276 When the issue came up again in Will, moreover, Justice 
Brennan added two classic law dictionaries—which likewise include 
states within the scope of “bodies politic” and/or “corporate”277—and two 
cases (one written by Chief Justice Marshall) stating that “[t]he United 
States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate” 
to his list of citations.278 
Independent research confirms that states were often called “bodies 
politic,” with or without reference to “bodies corporate” or the like, 
between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. A Senate 
resolution proposed in 1862 seeking to abolish slavery in states that had 
voted or otherwise acted to leave the Union, for example, said that “the 
treason” of secessionist conduct “works an instant forfeiture of all those 
functions and powers essential to the continued existence of the State as 
 
 275. See MASS. CONST. pmbl. (“The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration 
of government, is to secure the existence of the body politic, to protect it, and to furnish the 
individuals who compose it with the power of enjoying in safety and tranquility their natural 
rights, and the blessings of life . . . . The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of 
individuals: it is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and 
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common 
good.”); 1 JAMES WILSON  & BIRD WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, 
L.L.D. 304–05 (Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press 1804) (“In order to constitute a state, it is 
indispensably necessary, that the wills and the power of all the members be united in such a 
manner, that they shall never act nor desire but one and the same thing, in whatever relates to the 
end, for which the society is established. It is from this union of wills and of strength, that the 
state or body politick results.”); id. at 305 (“Smaller societies may be formed within a state by a 
part of its members. . . . To these societies the name of corporations is generally appropriated, 
though somewhat improperly; for the term is strictly applicable to supreme as well as to inferiour 
bodies politick.”); id. at 306 (“[I]n the United States, transactions have happened, which bear the 
nearest resemblance to this political idea, of any, of which history has preserved the account or 
the memory.”). 
 276. Quern, 440 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 661–62 (1871) (statement of Sen. Vickers) (“What is a State? Is it not a body 
politic and corporate?”); id. at 696 (statement of Sen. Edmunds) (“A State is a corporation . . . .”)). 
 277. See 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 185 
(11th ed., Philadelphia, George W. Childs 1866) (providing the following definitions, inter alia, 
of “body politic”: first, “[w]hen applied to the government, this phrase signifies the state”; second, 
“[w]hen it refers to corporations, the term body politic means that the members of such 
corporations shall be considered as an artificial person”); WALTER A. SHUMAKER & GEORGE 
FOSTER LONGSDORF, THE CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF LAW 104 (1901) (defining “body politic” 
as “[t]he old term for a corporation” and noting that the term was also “[a]pplied generally to the 
state or nation”); id. (defining “body corporate” as “[a] corporation”); United States v. Maurice, 
26 F. Cas. 1211, 1216 (C.C. Va. 1823) (Marshall, C.J.); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 
154 (1886) (quoting Maurice, 26 F. Cas. at 1216). 
 278. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 78 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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a body politic, so that . . . the State . . . ceases to exist.”279 Another 
example comes from an 1897 decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana, 
which specifically held that the state was a “person” within the meaning 
of a statute providing that “the word ‘person’ extends to bodies politic 
and corporate.”280 Similar illustrations exist in a variety of sources.281 
 
 279. S. JOURNAL, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 194–95 (1862) (emphasis omitted). 
 280. Ervin v. State ex rel. Walley, 48 N.E. 249, 251 (Ind. 1897) (noting that “Webster defines 
the words ‘body politic’ to be ‘the collective body of a nation or state as politically organized, or 
as exercising political functions; also a corporation’”).   
 281. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, 14th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. 102 (Fla. 1866) (objecting to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s proposed ratification on the ground that “[f]rom the moment of its 
engraftment upon the Constitution of the United States, the States would in effect cease to exist 
as bodies politic”), quoted in Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1650 (2013); C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New 
Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365, 369 (1899) (“The State of New York furnishes a good 
illustration of the two senses in which the term ‘United States’ is used under the Constitution; for 
the style of that State, as a body politic, is ‘The People of the State of New York,’ and the members 
of that body politic are the citizens of the State. The term ‘people,’ therefore, in that State, means, 
first, all the citizens of the State in the aggregate (i.e., the members of the body politic), and, 
secondly, the body politic itself; and while in the former sense it is plural, in the latter sense it is 
singular.”). The Rhode Island Royal Charter—which was dated July 8, l663, and remained “in 
force until the Constitution, adopted in November 1842, became operative on the first Tuesday of 
May, 1843”—also referred to the colony and its inhabitants by these terms. See, e.g., R.I. DEP’T 
OF STATE, Rhode Island Royal Charter Granted by King Charles II, 1663, 
https://catalog.sos.ri.gov/repositories/2/archival_objects/2136 [https://perma.cc/9AE9-9LNJ] 
(allowing the people of the colony “to create and make them a body politic or corporate, with the 
powers and privileges hereinafter mentioned”); id. (declaring that a long list of individuals and 
“all such others as now are, or hereafter shall be, admitted and made free of the company and 
society of our colony of Providence Plantations . . . shall be, from time to time, and forever 
hereafter, a body corporate and politic, in fact and name, by the name of the Governor and 
Company of the English Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations”). And given the 
Massachusetts Constitution’s usage of “body politic,” see supra note 275 and accompanying text, 
it may also be significant that a Massachusetts statute appears to have served as the template for 
the definition of “person” in the 1871 Dictionary Act. See GENERAL STATUTES OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ch. 3, § 7, at 50, 51 (William White, Boston 1860) (“In the 
construction of statutes the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the same 
statute, that is to say: . . . [t]he word ‘person’ may extend and be applied to bodies politic and 
corporate.” (citing Commonwealth v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 25, 45 (1849) (relying 
on the fact that “the preamble of the constitution sets forth that instrument, as the mode of forming 
the inhabitants of the commonwealth into a body politic” to suggest that a previous statutory 
definition whereby “the word ‘person’” could “extend and be applied to bodies politic and 
corporate, as well as to individuals” may have embraced Massachusetts), overruled in part by 
New Haven & Northampton Co. v. Northampton, 102 Mass. 116 (1869))); CONG. GLOBE, 41st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2465 (1870) (statement of Rep. Poland) (remarking that “I believe I copied the 
section [in the 1871 Dictionary Act stating that ‘words importing the masculine gender may be 
applied to females’]”—which was the same as the section articulating the definition of “person,” 
see Ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (1871) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1)—“literally from a 
general provision in the revised statutes of Massachusetts”); see also Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Cure 
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The Will majority “disagree[d]” with Justice Brennan that “‘the phrase 
“bodies politic and corporate” was understood to include the States.’”282 
Instead, the majority argued, “an examination of authorities of the era 
suggests that the phrase was used to mean corporations, both private and 
public (municipal), and not to include the States.”283 But while the 
sources the majority cited generally call municipalities “bodies politic” 
and/or “corporate” or, again, describe them using language that seems 
functionally equivalent,284 they do not indicate that those terms were 
necessarily or even usually understood to exclude states.285 Indeed, as 
Justice Brennan noted,286 most specifically say that the terms included 
states.287 
 
Without A Disease: The Emerging Doctrine of Successor Liability in International Trade 
Regulation, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 127, 146 & n.90 (2006) (discussing this legislative history and 
stating that 1 U.S.C. § 1, “originally known as the Dictionary Act, was likely copied from a 
Massachusetts statute”). 
 282. 491 U.S. at 69 (quoting id. at 78 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).  
 283. Id. 
 284. See id. at 69 n.9. 
 285. One case and one law dictionary the majority cited do not say the phrases can include 
states. See United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 321 (1876) (“The term ‘person’ as . . . used [in a 
New York statute] applies to natural persons, and also to artificial persons,—bodies politic, 
deriving their existence and powers from legislation,—but cannot be so extended as to include 
within its meaning the Federal government. It would require an express definition to that effect to 
give it a sense thus extended. And [according to the New York Court of Appeals,] the term 
‘corporation’ in the statute applies only to such corporations as are created under the laws of the 
State.”); 1 ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 212 (2d ed., New York, 
Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1871) (defining “body corporate” as a “corporation” and “body politic” as 
a “term applied to a corporation, which is usually designated as a body corporate and politic” and 
a “body to take in succession, framed by policy”).  But the law dictionary, as Brennan noted, Will, 
491 U.S. at 79–80, says that “body politic” was “[p]articularly applied, in the old books, to a 
corporation sole,” BURRILL, supra, at 212, which the same source indicates included “the 
sovereign in England” but was “rare” in the United States, id. at 383 (defining “corporation sole” 
as a “corporation consisting of one person only, and his successors in some particular station, who 
are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly 
that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they would not have had”). 
 286. See Will, 491 U.S. at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[E]ach and every dictionary cited by 
the Court accords a broader realm—one that comfortably, and in most cases explicitly, includes 
the sovereign—to th[e] phrase [‘bodies politic and corporate’] than the Court gives it today.”). 
 287. One dictionary on which the majority relied gives the first definition of “body politic” 
as “[t]he governmental, sovereign power: a city or a State.” WILLIAM C. ANDERSON, A 
DICTIONARY OF LAW 127 (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1893). Later, it says that “‘[b]ody corporate 
and politic’ is said, in the older books, to be the most exact expression for a public corporation or 
corporation having powers of government.” Id. It also defines “body corporate or corporate body” 
as “[a]n artificial body; a corporation.” Id. Another dictionary to which the majority pointed 
begins its definition of “body politic” by saying that “[a] public corporation, or corporation having 
powers of government, is frequently spoken of as a body politic; and, in older books, ‘body 
corporate and politic’ is said to be the most exact expression for a corporation of this character.” 
1 BENJAMIN VAUGHAN ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR 
 
43
Crocker: Reconsidering Section 1983's Nonabrogation of Sovereign Immunity
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
566 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
What about the “longstanding interpretive presumption that ‘person’ 
does not include the sovereign,” referenced above?288 This came up in 
Will as well. “At the very least,” the majority said, “reading [Section 1983 
as including states] is not so clearly indicated that it provides reason to 
depart from the often-expressed understanding that ‘in common usage, 
the term “person” does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes 
employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.’”289 This 
presumption, Justice Brennan responded, pertained “only to the ‘enacting 
sovereign.’”290 Both the cases Justice Brennan cited and other scholarship 
support this intuitive proposition,291 although the majority was able to 
point to a recent case applying the presumption to the phrase “white 
 
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 155 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1879). But it then goes on to say that 
“body politic is often used in a general way, as meaning the state or the sovereign power, or the 
city government, without implying any distinct express incorporation.” Id. This dictionary also 
defines “body corporate” as a phrase that “was formerly much used to mean an artificial person” 
but that had been “replaced” by “corporation.” Id. A third dictionary the majority put forward—
the first edition of what is now called Black’s Law Dictionary—says that a “body politic” is “[a] 
term applied to a corporation, which is usually designated as a ‘body corporate and politic’” and 
that “[t]he term is particularly appropriate to a public corporation invested with powers and duties 
of government.” HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 143 (West Publ’g Co. 1891). 
It proceeds to say, however, that “body politic” is also “often used, in a rather loose way, to 
designate the state or nation or sovereign power, or the government of a county or municipality, 
without distinctly connoting any express and individual corporate character.” Id. 
 288. Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1861–62 (2019) (quoting Vt. 
Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780–81 (2000)); see supra 
text accompanying note 238. 
 289.  Will, 491 U.S. at 64 (second and third alterations in original). 
 290.  Id. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 
186 (1936)). 
 291.  See California, 297 U.S. at 186–87 (“Respondent invokes the canon of construction that 
a sovereign is presumptively not intended to be bound by its own statute unless named in 
it . . . . We can perceive no reason for extending [this principle] so as to exempt a business carried 
on by a state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-embracing in 
scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being obstructed by state as by individual 
action. Language and objectives so plain are not to be thwarted by resort to a rule of construction 
whose purpose is but to resolve doubts, and whose application in the circumstances would be 
highly artificial.”); Jefferson Cnty. Pharm. Ass’n v. Abbott Lab’ys, 460 U.S. 150, 161 n.21 (1983) 
(stating that previous cases “suggest that this sovereign-exception rule of statutory construction 
simply means that a government, when it passes a law, gives up only what it expressly surrenders”; 
citing the passage from California quoted supra; and refusing to apply the rule to exempt state 
activity from congressional regulation); Burnham & Fayz, supra note 212, at 11 (stating that “[i]n 
a consistent line of cases from the turn of the century through 1983, the Court relied on ordinary 
rules of statutory construction to find that states are ‘persons’ in a host of federal statutes” and 
collecting citations); id. at 13 (“The case law relied upon in Will does support a presumption 
against inclusion of ‘the sovereign’ in statutes. However, this rule has no applicability to states’ 
inclusion in federal statutes such as section 1983, because the only ‘sovereign’ which it excludes 
is the enacting sovereign, e.g., the United States.”); id. at 13 n.76 (tracing the rule’s history). 
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person” to exclude a state.292 In any event, Justice Brennan continued, the 
Court made clear just three years after Section 1983’s passage that “even 
the principle as applied to the enacting sovereign” does not apply 
“‘[w]here an act of Parliament is made for the public good, as for the 
advancement of religion and justice or to prevent injury and wrong.’”293 
As Justice Brennan concluded, “[i]t would be difficult to imagine a statute 
more clearly designed ‘for the public good,’ and ‘to prevent injury and 
wrong,’ than § 1983.”294 
On balance, the evidence that in 1871 states fit well within the phrase 
“bodies politic and corporate” appears to outweigh the evidence that they 
did not.295 And that makes sense given that some uses of the word 
“person” in federal statutes simply must have included states—including 
in places where the word refers to parties in litigation. Take the judicial 
oath, for instance. Federal statutes have required judges to pledge that 
they “will administer justice without respect to persons” ever since the 
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789.296 Surely the term “persons” in 
these statutes has always included states, which the Constitution has 
always envisioned appearing as litigants in federal court.297 
 
 292.  See Will, 491 U.S. at 64 (“In Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, we followed this rule in 
construing the phrase ‘white person’ contained in 25 U.S.C. § 194 as not including the ‘sovereign 
States of the Union’” (quoting 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979)). 
 293.  Id. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 
251, 255 (1874)); see also United States v. Knight, 39 U.S. 301, 315 (1840). 
 294.  Will, 491 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 295.  One could argue that “bodies politic and corporate” should be construed as a single term 
of art, not as a phrase comprising two separate concepts (bodies politic and bodies corporate). 
This seems possible, but contemporary evidence supports a contrary position. A set of 
commissioners tasked with codifying federal laws around that time wrote of the 1871 Dictionary 
Act definition that “if the phrase ‘bodies politic’ is precisely equivalent to ‘corporations,’ it is 
redundant; but if, on the contrary, ‘body politic’ is somewhat broader, . . . then the provision goes 
further than is convenient”—in both instances viewing “bodies politic” and “bodies corporate” as 
separate concepts (albeit ones that might be duplicative). 1 REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES 
STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE 19 (1872); see 
infra text accompanying notes 300–311. And even if “bodies politic and corporate” was 
something like a hendiadys, the evidence does not necessarily show that it excluded states. See 
Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in the 
Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 695 (2016) (“Hendiadys is a figure of speech in which two 
terms, separated by a conjunction, are melded together to form a single complex expression.”). 
After all, several sources cited above refer to states as bodies “politic and corporate” or “corporate 
and politic.” See supra notes 273, 276; supra text accompanying note 280. 
 296. See ch. 20, § 8, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (emphasis added). The current version of the judicial oath 
traces back to the enactment of the Judicial Code of 1948. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 
§ 453, 62 Stat. 869, 907 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 453). 
 297. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend,” inter 
alia, “to Controversies between two or more States; . . . between a State and Citizens of another 
State; . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”), 
amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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2.  The Dictionary Act’s 1874 Definition 
Justice Brennan’s Will dissent briefly raises—and tries to deflect—
another issue regarding the Dictionary Act. “[I]t is a matter of small 
importance,” Justice Brennan argued, that the “definition of ‘person’ as 
including bodies politic and corporate was retroactively withdrawn when 
the federal statutes were revised in 1874.”298 For when “determining 
Congress’ intent in using this term” in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 two 
months after including “bodies politic and corporate” within the 
Dictionary Act’s description of “person,” Justice Brennan continued, “it 
cannot be decisive that, three years later, it withdrew th[e] presumption” 
that such entities would qualify.299  
Whatever the Dictionary Act in 1874 said “person” meant, that 
definition seems potentially more relevant to how one should read 
Section 1983 than Justice Brennan credited. For while Justice Brennan 
was focused on “Congress’ intent,” the amendment to the Dictionary Act 
in 1874 could say something about the meaning of the word “person” to 
wider audiences, including the general public in 1871 or afterward.  
In fact, the story behind the 1874 shift in the federal statutory 
definition of “person” is a fascinating but confounding one—and with 
respect to this particular provision, a story that appears never to have been 
told before. In 1866, acting pursuant to congressional authorization, 
President Andrew Johnson “appoint[ed] three persons, learned in the law, 
as commissioners, to revise, simplify, arrange, and consolidate all statutes 
of the United States, general and permanent in their nature.”300 After 
toiling for years with several illustrious members, including a previous 
U.S. Attorney General and future Supreme Court nominee, the 
commission submitted its work to a joint congressional committee in 
early 1873.301 
Unfortunately for the commissioners, “[i]t was the opinion of the joint 
committee that [they] had so changed and amended the statutes that it 
would be impossible to secure the passage of their revision.”302 
Accordingly, the joint committee selected Thomas Jefferson Durant, “an 
accomplished member of the Supreme Court bar and Louisiana unionist 
during the War,” to finish the codification project.303 Durant reported 
 
 298. Will, 491 U.S. at 81 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 299. Id. at 81–82. 
 300. Revision of Statutes Acts of 1866, ch. 140, § 1, 14 Stat. 74, 74–75 (1866); see Ralph H. 
Dwan & Ernest R. Feidler, The Federal Statutes—Their History and Use, 22 MINN. L. REV. 1008, 
1013 (1938). 
 301. Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1013; Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on 
a Jurisdictional Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469, 517 & n.196 (1989). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Goldstein, supra note 301, at 518.  
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back in December 1873,304 and Congress ordered his work printed as the 
Revised Statutes of the United States in June 1874.305 As part of this 
process, Congress repealed all preexisting public laws and enacted 
Durant’s compilation in their place.306 
The Dictionary Act that Congress had approved on February 25, 1871, 
said that “in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word ‘person’ may extend 
and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . unless the context 
shows that such words were intended to be used in a more limited 
sense.”307 The Dictionary Act in the 1874 revision, by contrast, said that 
“[i]n determining the meaning of the revised statutes, or of any act or 
resolution of Congress passed subsequent to February [25, 1871], . . . the 
word ‘person’ may extend and be applied to partnerships and 
corporations . . . unless the context shows that such words were intended 
to be used in a more limited sense.”308 
Who changed the relevant language from “bodies politic and 
corporate,” which likely included states, to “partnerships and 
corporations,” which less likely did so? The original commissioners. And 
for what reason? Notes the commissioners printed in 1872 disclose that 
they thought “that partnerships ought to be included; and that if the phrase 
‘bodies politic’ is precisely equivalent to ‘corporations,’ it is redundant; 
but if, on the contrary, ‘body politic’ is somewhat broader, . . . then the 
provision goes further than is convenient.”309 Significantly, they 
identified their specific concern as the possibility that “body politic” 
could “be understood to include a government, such as a State.”310 This, 
they said, “requires the draughtsman, in the majority of cases of 
employing the word ‘person,’ to take care that States, Territories, foreign 
governments, &c., appear to be excluded.”311 
The commissioners’ notes provide strong support for the notion that 
“bodies politic” in the specific setting of the 1871 Dictionary Act would 
have been regularly (even if not uniformly) understood to include states. 
That reading of the phrase was so natural, the commissioners thought, 
 
 304. See THOMAS J. DURANT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES ON THE REVISION OF THE LAWS 1 (1873). 
 305. See Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 333, § 3, 18 Stat., pt. 3, 113, 113.  
 306. Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1012. 
 307. Ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (1871) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1) (emphasis 
added). 
 308. Revised Statutes of 1874, § 1, 18 Stat., pt. 1, 1, 1 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1) 
(emphasis added). 
 309. 1 REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS 
APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE 19 (1872). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id.; see also Gerardi, supra note 239, at 2250–51 n.52. A year after Will, the Supreme 
Court relied on these notes to hold that territories are not suable “persons” under Section 1983. 
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 191–92 (1990). 
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that statutory drafters were “require[d]” to “exclude[]” states where 
Congress did not want them covered. That the commissioners believed 
such exclusions necessary “in the majority of cases of employing the 
word ‘person’” speaks at least as much to the strength (rather than any 
weakness) of the connection between states and “bodies politic.” For if 
states were not regularly understood to qualify, excepting them would 
have been unnecessary. 
Critically, the commissioners’ notes also help show that Congress 
almost certainly enacted the new definition of “person” by mistake—
meaning with most (or maybe even all) members believing there was no 
new definition of “person” included in the revision at all. The notes show 
that the commission intentionally changed the Dictionary Act’s entry for 
“person.”312 And the whole point of Congress “hand[ing] over” the 
project to Durant was “so that he might expunge all changes in the law 
made by the commission.”313 Durant said that he sought to do just that. 
In explaining his drafting process, for instance, Durant wrote to Congress 
that  
[e]very section reported by the commissioners has been 
compared with the text of the corresponding act or portion 
of the act of Congress referred to, and wherever it has been 
found that a section contained any departure from the 
meaning of Congress as expressed in the Statutes at Large, 
such change has been made as was necessary to restore the 
original signification.314 
What is more, the members of the House Committee on the Revision of 
the Laws, who were checking over Durant’s work, repeatedly reassured 
their congressional colleagues that “there is not known to the committee 
a change of a syllable or of a comma of the statutes so as to change their 
effect.”315 
 
 312. In the commissioners’ defense, as the chairman of the House Committee on the 
Revision of the Laws explained, “[b]y the original law of 1866, under which the commissioners 
were appointed, they were authorized to make changes to some extent.” 2 CONG. REC. 646 (1874) 
(statement of Rep. Poland). In the chairman’s opinion, the commissioners “probably” did not 
“avail[] themselves” of that “liberty” more “than they were warranted in doing.” Id. The joint 
committee, he said, simply “came to the conclusion that within the limited time that could be 
allowed for the work in th[e] House, it would be utterly impossible to carry the measure through, 
if it was understood that it contained new legislation.” Id. 
 313. Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1013–14. 
 314. DURANT, supra note 304, at 1. 
 315. 2 CONG. REC. 820 (1874) (statement of Rep. Hoar); see also, e.g., id. at 129 (statement 
of Rep. Butler) (“[Y]our committee felt it their bounden duty not to allow, so far as they could 
ascertain, any change of the law. This embodies the law as it is. The temptation, of course, was 
very great, where a law seemed to be imperfect, to perfect it by the alteration of words or phrases, 
or to make some change. But that temptation has, so far as I know and believe, been resisted. We 
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Nevertheless, Durant preserved the commission’s change to the 
definition of “person,” and the House committee seems not to have 
caught (or at least not to have drawn any attention to) the discrepancy 
with the Statutes at Large. Seemingly shorn of the commissioners’ 
explanatory notes,316 and seemingly with no clear indication that anything 
was amiss,317 Durant’s apparently erroneous rendering of the Dictionary 
Act was enacted by Congress.  
As it turns out, Durant’s compilation was riddled with problems that 
were not exposed until after it became law.318 Within a few years, at least 
252 defects were discovered,319 requiring Congress to pass “constant[] 
correct[ions].”320 In 1877, “a statute was approved authorizing the 
president to appoint a commissioner to prepare a new edition of the 
Revised Statutes, inserting the statutes amending, modifying, and 
affecting” Durant’s original edition.321 In 1878, Congress approved the 
new edition as “legal evidence” of the laws.322 But once bitten, twice shy, 
 
have not attempted to change the law, in a single word or letter, so as to make a different reading 
or different sense. All that has been done is to strike out the obsolete parts and to condense and 
consolidate and bring together statutes in pari materia; so that you have here, except in so far as 
it is human to err, the laws of the United States under which we now live.”); Goldstein, supra note 
301, at 520 (explaining that “[a]fter each member of the joint committee on revision had reviewed 
for accuracy the particular titles allocated to him, he led the congressional review of those portions 
in a series of sixteen special nighttime sessions”). 
 316. See Goldstein, supra note 301, at 518 (stating that Durant’s draft “omitted all of the 
Commission’s textual notes”); see also id. at 519 n.199 (stating that “the rare book room of the 
Library of Congress contains two almost identical copies of Durant’s printed draft” and that “[a] 
third copy with different marginal notes, obscurely referred to in the Library of Congress card 
catalogue, could not be located”); id. (“During the debates, attempts were made to compare the 
Durant printed draft with the Commissioner’s draft containing the marginal notes; but differences 
in section numbering and pagination, and limited numbers of copies, made this difficult.”); 2 
CONG. REC. 826 (1874) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (leaving little doubt that the initial version 
of Durant’s revision omitted all extraneous material from the commission’s work, including 
citations to the Statutes at Large: “The commissioners, as the law under which they acted required 
of them, added ‘side notes’ or marginal references on the pages of their volumes to the original 
statute, giving the volume, chapter, page, and section ‘from which each section is compiled and 
to the decisions of . . . courts, explaining or expounding the same’ . . . . The statute under which 
Mr. Durant acted did not require any such reference, and he has, therefore, omitted all this.”). 
 317. See 2 CONG. REC. 822 (1874) (seeming to show that no comments were made when the 
clerk apparently read the relevant part of the bill on the House floor). 
 318. Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1014. 
 319. Id. 
 320. 7 CONG. REC. 1,137 (1878) (statement of Sen. Christiancy). 
 321. Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1016 (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1877, ch. 82, 19 Stat. 
268). 
 322. Compare Act of Mar. 2, 1877, § 4, 19 Stat. at 269 (stating that the new edition would 
be “legal and conclusive evidence of the laws . . . therein contained”), with Act of Mar. 9, 1878, 
ch. 26, 20 Stat. 27, 27 (striking out the word “conclusive” from the description of the new edition 
as evidence of the laws and adding that the new edition “shall not preclude reference to, nor 
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Congress declined to repeal the body of existing statutes or to enact the 
new edition as law itself.323 
The Dictionary Act’s entry for “person” stayed constant between the 
first and second editions of the Revised Statutes.324 The final versions of 
both editions, moreover, contain a marginal annotation pointing to the 
provisions of the Statutes at Large purportedly incorporated into the 
definitions, and both annotations list the 1871 Dictionary Act as the most 
recent legislation reflected there.325 So in 1874, the pertinent statutory 
language became “partnerships and corporations.” But from all 
indications, it should have remained “bodies politic and corporate.” 
It is quite possible, of course, that the apparent failures to notice the 
change to the definition of “person” were entirely inadvertent. That 
would make sense in light of the volume of alterations in the original 
commissioners’ work, the process through which Durant drafted his 
compilation,326 and the number of inaccuracies that escaped the oversight 
of the House committee and Congress at large.  
But one could also ponder whether any of the failures might have been 
intentional. Professor Robert Goldstein, for instance, has pointed to the 
possibility that Durant purposely preserved a different change the original 
commissioners made: the removal of a Reconstruction provision 
“allowing federal courts to adjudicate causes ‘affecting’ persons unable 
to secure in state court the equal rights guaranteed to them by federal 
law,” which Goldstein calls “the ‘affecting jurisdiction.’”327 Noting that 
 
control, in case of any discrepancy, the effect of any original act as passed by Congress since 
[December 1, 1873]”). 
 323. See supra note 322; see also Dwan & Feidler, supra note 300, at 1016 & n.45. 
 324. Compare supra note 308 and accompanying text, with 1 Rev. Stat. § 1 (2d ed. 1878) 
(codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1) (“In determining the meaning of the revised statutes, or of 
any act or resolution of Congress passed subsequent to February [25, 1871], . . . the word ‘person’ 
may extend and be applied to partnerships and corporations . . . unless the context shows that such 
words were intended to be used in a more limited sense . . . .”). 
 325. See 1 Rev. Stat. § 1 (2d ed. 1878) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1) (including “25 
Feb., 1871, c. 71, s. 2, v. 16, p. 431” as the most recent enactment in the marginal annotation 
under “Definitions”); Revised Statutes of 1874, § 1, 18 Stat., pt. 1, 1, 1 (codified as amended at 1 
U.S.C. § 1) (same).  
 326. Durant began not with the text of the Statutes at Large (which would have taken far 
longer than the nine-month maximum his assignment had been allotted, see 2 CONG. REC. 827 
(1874) (statement of Rep. Lawrence)), but instead with the original commissioners’ portfolio. 
DURANT, supra note 304, at 1. Based on Durant’s description of this dossier, it is easy to see how 
he could have missed some modifications or introduced new ones while reworking it. “The 
draught on the revision of the laws of the United States accepted by you from the commissioners, 
and delivered by you to the undersigned, was a bundle of twenty-three hundred and ninety-eight 
sheets,” Durant explained in his report to the joint committee. Id. These pages, he said, were 
“detached, partly printed, partly in manuscript, [and] profusely interspersed with interlineations 
and corrections.” Id. 
 327. Goldstein, supra note 301, at 477 (describing the provision, which was part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27). 
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“[t]he reasons for Durant’s failure to rectify or report the Commission’s 
elimination of the affecting jurisdiction . . . remain obscure,” Goldstein—
citing litigation work of Durant’s—writes that “[o]ne may speculate that 
he was unsympathetic to the affecting jurisdiction and not predisposed to 
restoring it in his draft.”328 
A statutory amendment made inadvertently should still count as a 
statutory amendment.329 Although the Court has sometimes endorsed the 
rebuttable proposition that “[i]t will not be inferred that the legislature, in 
revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their policy,”330 
at least one prominent proponent of this presumption, Cass Sunstein, 
contends that because of the sweeping nature of the 1874 codification, 
interpreters must give it full effect.331 The point here, however, is not that 
courts should have ignored the subtraction of “bodies politic and 
corporate” from the definition of “person.” The point here, instead, is that 
this change provides little if any support for the notion that the public in 
1871 would have understood the definition to exclude states—and in fact 
 
 328. Id. at 519. 
 329.  See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (stating that “we have 
historically assumed that Congress intended what it enacted,” such that it is irrelevant whether 
“Congress was unaware of what it accomplished”). Professor Nelson points out that “[o]ne might 
sensibly debate whether the word ‘person’ in the current version of [Section 1983] draws its 
meaning from 1 U.S.C. § 1, as amended in 1948, or instead from Section 1 of the Revised Statutes 
of 1874.” CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 786 (2011). But he says “it is very 
difficult to defend Justice Brennan’s view [in Will] that the meaning of the word ‘person’ in 
[Section 1983] comes neither from 1 U.S.C. § 1 nor from Rev. Stat. § 1, but instead from the 
original version of the Dictionary Act as adopted by Congress in 1871.” Id. The argument here 
assumes that because of its broad language (directing that its definitions govern “[i]n determining 
the meaning of any Act of Congress”), the current Dictionary Act controls. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis 
added). But the argument here also assumes that the previous Dictionary Acts may be relevant to 
determining whether Section 1983’s “context indicates” that a more expansive meaning than the 
default one applies. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 241–244. 
 330. United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 740 (1884).  
 331. See Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 394, 407 (1982) (“[S]tatutory revisions undertaken by a commission created to 
compile and organize existing law should not lightly be understood as making major changes. In 
enacting statutory revisions submitted by such commissions, Congress is entitled to rely on their 
good faith and should not be forced to read every provision with care. . . . [A] revision of a statute, 
even if it appears to make a change in its text, should usually be interpreted conformably to 
preexisting law.”); id. at 408 (“[T]he revision of 1874 was in many respects unique. Unlike more 
recent revisions, conducted as part of a continuing process of making the laws coherent and 
accessible, it involved the consolidation and clarification of numerous conflicting and ambiguous 
provisions. Its purpose was to bring all of these provisions together in a single authoritative 
volume. In the process, a number of changes were made. If these changes—even when 
unambiguous—were not given full effect, but instead were parsed by reference to pre-codification 
law, the principal purpose of the revision would be frustrated. The revision would not be 
authoritative, but a mere guide to congressional purposes expressed elsewhere, and the previous 
inconsistencies would be perpetuated.”). 
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strengthens the possibility that the public in 1871 would have understood 
the definition to include states. 
B.  Expected Applications 
Various interpretive methodologies place weight on a statutory term’s 
expected applications among legislators.332 So it is worth considering 
whether members of the Congress that enacted Section 1983 thought it 
made states susceptible to suit. And it is also worth considering whether 
members of the public soon after Section 1983’s passage thought so, 
which sheds light on the statute’s contemporary construction.333 The 
analysis that follows takes up these questions in turn, focusing first on the 
statute’s legislative history and then on its litigation history.334 
1.  Legislative History 
As described earlier, the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment and its 
relation to any extratextual source of state sovereign immunity appear to 
have remained at least somewhat up in the air during Reconstruction.335 
Just as one can find support for a broad understanding of 
constitutionalized state sovereign immunity in the mid-nineteenth 
century,336 one can also find support for a narrow understanding during 
this time period.337 The Supreme Court would not decide Hans, and 
 
 332. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 102 (2010) (“A court that 
looks to purposes is a court that works as a partner with Congress.”); John F. Manning, The 
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003) (describing “strong intentionalism” as 
“permit[ting] a court to adjust a clear statute in the rare case in which the court finds that the 
statutory text diverges from the legislature’s true intent”). Even a dynamic approach to statutory 
interpretation may only come into play for “the hard cases in which ambiguous statutes must be 
interpreted in contexts not foreseen by the enacting legislature.” Bertrall L. Ross II, Against 
Constitutional Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1227 (2011). 
 333. See Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 283–86 
(2020) (discussing the “focus on ‘expected public meaning’” within “flexible textualism”). 
 334. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1750–51 (2020) (looking to a statute’s 
early litigation history to assert that “at least some people foresaw this potential application”); 
Manning, supra note 332, at 2390 (stating that the “legislature’s true intent” for purposes of strong 
intentionalism may be “derived from sources” including “the legislative history”). 
 335. See supra notes 184–97 and accompanying text. 
 336. Justice Story’s Commentaries are a favorite of this genre. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1669, at 538 (Boston, Hilliard, 
Gray, & Co. 1833) (“It is a known maxim, justified by the general sense and practice of mankind, 
and recognized in the law of nations, that it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
amesnable [sic] to the suit of any private person, without its own consent. This exemption is an 
attribute of sovereignty, belonging to every state in the Union; and was designedly retained by the 
national government.” (footnote omitted)). 
 337. See supra text accompanying notes 192–97 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion for the Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), and the Marshall 
Court’s approach to state sovereign immunity more generally). 
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would not start down the path of profound state protectionism it still 
travels today, until 1890.338  
Given this backdrop, it should come as little surprise that in debating 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, several congressmen adverted to the 
possibility of holding states monetarily liable for constitutional 
violations. As John Harrison’s masterful study of the Act’s legislative 
history explains, though, none of these comments came in discussions 
about Section 1, the precursor to Section 1983.339 Instead, they came in 
discussions about the so-called Sherman amendment, which sought to 
impose damages on localities for failing to prevent certain kinds of 
private violence.340  
One Republican opponent of the amendment, for instance, argued that 
“this duty of protection, if it rests anywhere, rests on the State,” such that 
“if there is to be any liability visited upon anybody for a failure to perform 
that duty, such liability should be brought home to the State.”341 He 
further remarked that  
this section would be liable to very much less objection, both 
in regard to its justice and its constitutionality, if it provided 
that if in any State the offenses named in this section were 
committed, suit might be brought against the State, judgment 
obtained, and payment of the judgment might be enforced 
upon the treasury of the State.342 
Another example comes from a Democratic detractor, who said that in 
light of the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, “there might be some plausible 
reasoning for saying that if the State did fail, then the State should be 
liable.”343 Employing that notion as a “reductio ad absurdum argument 
against Sherman’s proposal” (to quote Harrison),344 the legislator 
continued by contending that “upon the theory of this bill the capitol of 
the State might be sold out; its court-houses might be sold out, its lunatic 
asylums might be sold out, every institution of charity belonging to it 
might be sold out,” and “all its funds in the State treasury might be 
seized,” leaving it “without any means whatsoever to carry on the State 
government.”345 
So where do congressional comments concerning state suability in 
conjunction with the Civil Rights Act of 1871 leave things? No concrete 
evidence appears to indicate that legislators believed the measure, as 
 
 338. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47. 
 339. See Harrison, supra note 235, at 375–78. 
 340. See id. at 378–81. 
 341. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 791 (1871) (statement of Rep. Willard). 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. at 772 (statement of Sen. Thurman). 
 344. Harrison, supra note 235, at 380. 
 345. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 772 (1871) (statement of Sen. Thurman). 
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enacted, would subject states to damages liability. (The Sherman 
amendment, it bears noting, eventually passed in a form that applied only 
to individuals.346) “[I]t is conceivable,” of course, that Republicans “were 
pulling a Trojan Horse, supporting a measure that had far-reaching 
implications that they did not want to announce” (to quote Harrison 
again).347 But it seems more likely that the congressmen “did not even 
fully appreciate” the potential “implications” of their own use of the word 
“person” in Section 1.348  
Harrison argues that “most probably a substantial and decisive bloc of 
Republicans, indeed, probably a majority of them” thought abrogating 
sovereign immunity was constitutionally impossible.349 The use of hedge 
words seems appropriate. But even if Harrison is right about the 
overarching belief of Republican congressmen, the repeated references to 
state suability in the legislative record demonstrate that the matter—both 
as to constitutional understandings and legislative attitudes—was by no 
means as clear-cut as the Court would later assume.  
Given the lack of strong evidence that congressmen intended to 
include states in Section 1983’s ambit, one could ask whether the 
retroactive application of the abrogation-related clear-statement rule is 
actually antidemocratic in this context. The answer is yes. As an initial 
matter, some schools of statutory interpretation care little if at all about 
the subjective thoughts of specific congresspeople, largely severing 
congressional intent from democratic legitimacy.350 More broadly, the 
antidemocratic effect of applying a clear-statement rule based on 
substantive values inheres in the later judicial denial of earlier legislative 
authority to select among the full range of available interventions: the 
problem is the risk of requiring second-best statutory interpretations, not 
the result.351    
2.  Litigation History 
Turning from congressmen to the public they served, the statute’s 
early litigation history provides additional support for the notion that 
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 could have been interpreted to 
cover states. Section 1983 is famous for how infrequently plaintiffs 
 
 346. See Harrison, supra note 235, at 382. 
 347. Id. at 388. The specific Trojan Horse to which Harrison refers is the possibility that 
Republicans smuggled abrogation authority into Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment without 
saying anything about it in the Amendment’s legislative history. See id. But the same logic could 
apply to state suability under Section 1983. 
 348. Id.  
 349. Id. at 385. 
 350.  See infra Part III.C. 
 351.  See Slocum, supra note 83, at 639 (describing “second-best interpretations” as ones 
“that would not have been chosen if not for the application of” a particular “rule[] of 
interpretation”). 
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appear to have relied on it before the Court decided Monroe in 1961352—
and for the wide variety of possible reasons why.353 So it should come as 
little surprise that the pool of cases from which the inquiry started was 
small. But research revealed two cases from the 1870’s where individuals 
apparently attempted to hold states accountable for constitutional 
violations in federal court under Section 1983—and that neither case 
failed on the ground that a state was an improper party. 
Consider first the 1874 case Illinois v. Chicago & A.R. Co.354 Illinois 
brought a prosecution in state court against a railroad for violating a state 
rate statute.355 Relying on the statute now called Section 1983, the 
railroad sought and obtained a writ of certiorari from a federal court to 
remove the case from the state judicial system to the federal judicial 
system.356 The state moved to quash the writ.357 The federal court 
addressed two issues—first, whether the railroad company could claim 
the protections of Section 1983, and second, whether Section 1983 
granted the federal courts removal jurisdiction in addition to original 
jurisdiction.358 The court assumed that the answer to the former question 
was yes and held that the answer to the latter question was no.359 
Chicago & A.R. Co. matters for present purposes because (while not 
expressly discussed in the decision) it seems that the railroad’s theory of 
the case must have depended on Illinois being a “person” within the 
meaning of Section 1983, which would have been necessary to allow the 
railroad to remove to federal court a case in which the state was the only 
adverse party.360 This suggests that regardless how congressmen thought 
the statute would work, litigants around the time of its adoption thought 
it at least potentially applied to states. The court, moreover, raised no 
doubts about this aspect of the case. The court wrote that if the railroad 
was right that it could claim the protections of Section 1983 and “if it be 
conceded, further, that the state was prosecuting an action of debt for a 
penalty which could not be imposed without causing the company to be 
 
 352. See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its 
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 819 n.37 (2010) (“For 
nearly one hundred years after its enactment, [Section 1983] was rarely used . . . . Thus, between 
1871 and 1920, only twenty-one section 1983 actions were decided by federal courts . . . .”). 
Figures like these may be limited by the available evidence, for courts did not always recount the 
precise statutory basis for their authority to decide cases. But figures like these still provide a 
general indication of the scarcity of Section 1983 litigation. 
 353. See, e.g., Blackmun, supra note 207, at 7–20. 
 354. 12 F. Cas. 1197 (C.C.S.D. Ill. 1874). 
 355. Id. at 1197. 
 356. See id. at 1197–98. 
 357. See id.  
 358. See id. at 1198. 
 359. See id. at 1198–99. 
 360. See id. at 1198. 
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subjected to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities granted 
by the constitution,” the operative issue was removal—and, by 
implication, removal alone.361 
A second early instance in which a party invoked Section 1983 in a 
suit against a state was somewhat similar. Like Chicago & A.R. Co., the 
1878 case Ex parte Wells362 seems to have presented a question about 
Section 1983 and removal.363 Three individuals, all of whom were 
“returning officers” of the 1876 presidential election, all of whom were 
Republicans, and two of whom were Black, were charged by the 
Louisiana attorney general with falsifying vote tallies.364 The petitioners 
sought a writ of certiorari to remove the prosecution to federal court under 
Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.365 In its codified form, this 
statute provided that any state civil or criminal suit “against any person 
who is denied or cannot enforce in the judicial tribunals of the 
State . . . any right secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil 
rights of citizens of the United States” could be removed to federal 
court.366 The petitioners’ attorneys appeared to have argued that Section 
1983 qualified as a law providing for equal civil rights within the meaning 
of this provision—such that their clients’ potential loss of the Sixth 
Amendment impartial-jury right because of racial prejudice, among other 
potential deprivations, secured them a spot in federal court.367  
The federal court—speaking through Justice Joseph Bradley, who 
would later write the majority opinion in Hans, riding circuit—rejected 
the plea for removal on the ground that the constitutional violations the 
petitioners alleged were not constitutional violations at all.368 The 
procedure for selecting jurors by commissioners, the court said, was 
above reproach.369 And while “[t]he commissioners, it is true, may abuse 
their trust[,] . . . no system can be devised that will not be liable to 
abuses.”370 The court reasoned similarly with respect to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866. “It is only when some . . . hostile state legislation can be 
shown to exist, interfering with the party’s right of defense, that he can 
 
 361. Id.  
 362. 29 F. Cas. 633 (C.C.D. La. 1878). 
 363. See id. at 634 (background information preceding opinion). 
 364. Id. at 633 (synopsis). 
 365. Ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1443); see Wells, 29 F. Cas. at 633 (synopsis). 
 366. 1 Rev. Stat. § 641. 
 367. See Wells, 29 F. Cas. at 633–34 (synopsis and background information preceding 
opinion). 
 368. Id. at 634–35 (opinion). 
 369. See id. 
 370. Id. at 635. 
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have his cause removed to the federal court.”371 The court held that the 
petitioners’ “allegations with regard to the manipulation of the law in 
such manner as to secure a jury inimical to [them], and with regard to the 
existence of a general prejudice against them in the minds of the court, 
the jurors, the officials and the people,” did not qualify.372 
Again, therefore, litigants relied on Section 1983 in an attempt to get 
a case against a state into federal court. And again, the attempt failed for 
reasons having nothing to do with whether Section 1983 applied to states. 
To be sure, Section 1983 was not as central in Wells as it was in Chicago 
& A.R. Co. But the “right secured” by Section 1983 was the right to seek 
redress against any “person” who violated someone’s federal legal 
protections. To the extent the petitioners sought to vindicate this right by 
removing their state-court prosecution to federal court, the “person” 
available to be held accountable would appear to have been the state 
itself. So Wells, too, suggests that some members of the public interpreted 
Section 1983 to operate against states themselves. 
To be sure, these cases do not provide unassailable proof that Section 
1983 was initially understood to cover states. The parties seeking federal-
court review may have been grasping at jurisdictional straws; the analysis 
here may overread the litigation strategies; or both. But these cases offer 
some early potential evidence in favor of the interpretation explored here.   
C.  Methodological Matters 
Sometimes statutes can entail “unexpected consequences.”373 So 
begins Justice Neil Gorsuch’s pioneering and provocative majority 
opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County,374 decided last year. Bostock held 
that the prohibition on sex discrimination in Title VII forbids adverse 
employment actions on the basis of sexual orientation or transgender 
identity—notwithstanding, as Gorsuch observed, that “[t]hose who 
adopted the Civil Rights Act [of 1964] might not have anticipated their 
work would lead to this particular result.”375  
The outlook here is meant to be ecumenical among interpretive 
methodologies (while admittedly emphasizing the kind of textualist 
considerations stressed by the current Supreme Court). But for someone 
who follows an approach similar to Bostock’s, what could amount to the 
best interpretation of “person” in Section 1983 might have surprised 
many of the legislators who adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1871. For 
under that approach, “the limits of the drafters’ imagination supply no 
 
 371. Id. (possibly suggesting this removal provision was limited to rights secured by the 
same act). 
 372. Id. 
 373. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020). 
 374. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
 375. Id. at 1737. 
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reason to ignore the law’s demands.”376 To the contrary, the Court said: 
“When the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual 
considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is 
the law . . . .”377 
Professor Tara Grove has explained that “Bostock revealed . . . 
important tensions within” the textualist school of thought.378 On the one 
hand, Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion employed what Grove calls 
“formalistic textualism,” which “instructs interpreters to carefully parse 
the statutory language, focusing on semantic context and downplaying 
policy concerns or the practical (even monumental) consequences of the 
case.”379 On the other hand, Justice Samuel Alito’s and Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh’s dissents (with the former joined by Justice Clarence 
Thomas) employed what Grove calls “flexible textualism,” which 
“attends to text but permits interpreters to make sense of that text by 
considering policy and social context as well as practical 
consequences.”380 In Bostock itself, these extratextual concerns centered 
around arguments about how members of the enacting Congress assumed 
the statute would apply.381 
The issue of state suability under Section 1983 presents a fascinating 
case study in formalistic versus flexible textualism. Indeed, much of the 
Court’s language in Bostock favoring semantic meaning over expected 
applications could map directly onto the present discussion. The statute 
in question “is a major piece of federal civil rights legislation”; “[i]t is 
written in starkly broad terms”; “[i]t has repeatedly produced unexpected 
applications, at least in the view of those on the receiving end of them”; 
and “Congress’s key drafting choices . . . virtually guaranteed that 
unexpected applications would emerge over time.”382 To the extent that 
Section 1983 may be best read as withdrawing states’ sovereign 
immunity, one could say just as in Bostock that “[t]his elephant has never 
hidden in a mousehole; it has been standing before us all along.”383 
There are, of course, many schools of statutory interpretation besides 
different forms of textualism. A few prominent alternatives include 
intentionalism, purposivism, imaginative reconstruction, dynamic 
 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Grove, supra note 333, at 266. 
 379. Id. at 267. 
 380. Id. 
 381. 140 S. Ct. at 1750. 
 382. Id. at 1753. 
 383. Id.; see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) 
(“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or 
ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”). 
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statutory interpretation, and practical reasoning.384 “Nor do these exhaust 
the list,” as one scholar puts it.385 How would the considerations fleshed 
out here bear on understandings of Section 1983 under these other 
approaches?  
“Intentionalists attempt to draw interpretive inferences from the 
legislature’s stated goals and from a statute’s legislative history.”386 
Because of the tight connection between a provision’s meaning and the 
enacting legislators’ expressions, intentionalism would likely look dimly 
on the possibility of including states within Section 1983’s scope. 
Purposivists believe that “[b]ecause ‘every statute . . . has some kind of 
purpose or objective,’ identifying that purpose and deducing the 
interpretation with which it is most consistent resolves interpretive 
ambiguities.”387 Given this more capacious lens, purposivism would 
probably look more favorably on the possibility of including states within 
Section 1983’s scope, especially in light of arguments that accomplishing 
Congress’s overarching goal of promoting constitutional enforcement 
through enacting Section 1983 as part of the exceptional Reconstruction 
era requires the availability of entity liability. Imaginative reconstruction 
says that “the judge should imagine that she is talking to the legislators at 
the time of enactment and should reconstruct how the legislators would 
have answered the interpretive question, given their values and their 
concerns.”388 As something of a middle ground between intentionalism 
and purposivism, either answer to the question about Section 1983 and 
state suability seems conceivable under this approach. 
That leaves dynamic statutory interpretation and practical reasoning. 
“Academic advocates of ‘dynamic’ interpretation argue that it is perfectly 
legitimate for statutory meanings to evolve to reflect current 
circumstances and contemporary mores,” which may include “ideas of 
sound policy” that “can change over time.”389 The practical-reasoning 
model posits that “statutory interpreters . . . are normally not driven by 
any single value . . . but are instead driven by multiple values,” including 
“finding the best answer according to modern policy.”390 These theories 
are multitextured and irreducible to simplistic applications. But to the 
extent that they include present policy considerations more than the 
 
 384.  Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory 
Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 17–18 (2003). 
 385.  Id. at 18. 
 386.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Symposium, Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and 
Empiricist, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 747, 747 (1995). 
 387.  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 333 (1990) (quoting 1 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 166–67 (tentative ed. 1958)). 
 388.  Id. at 329. 
 389.  NELSON, supra note 329, at 945. 
 390.  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 387, at 348. 
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frameworks discussed above do, their adherents may be especially likely 
to support including states as Section 1983 defendants for the normative 
reasons introduced below.391 
Even setting aside the ultimate answer (perhaps because one would 
weigh the evidence differently), the analysis here shows that whether an 
interpreter should understand Section 1983 as covering states qua states 
is a far closer question than the Court and previous commentary have 
acknowledged. One could, therefore, view the caselaw in this area as an 
instance of the Court imbuing indeterminate language with ideological 
content—which, as in the context of so-called common law statutes, 
could in theory point in opposite directions when it comes to pursuing an 
alternative course within the judicial system.392 Either way (whether the 
Court made a debatable call on interpretive grounds or a discretionary 
call on ideological grounds), the policy debate behind and possibility of 
political reform becomes quite important.  
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 
The preceding Parts have revealed substantial arguments for reading 
Section 1983 to abrogate sovereign immunity, which would make state 
governments susceptible to damages actions for violating constitutional 
rights. A decision like Bostock—which surprised many observers 
because of both the outcome and the majority opinion’s author393—may 
provide a bit of reason to think the Supreme Court could someday 
reconsider its caselaw in this area. But the evidence remains equivocal 
and may not be strong enough to justify overruling otherwise settled 
precedent. And while stare decisis stands as an obstacle to reassessing 
 
 391.  See infra Part IV. 
 392.  See Guardians Ass’n v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 641 n.12 (1983) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (stating that “Congress phrased some older statutes in sweeping, general terms, 
expecting the federal courts to interpret them by developing legal rules on a case-by-case basis in 
the common law tradition” and citing Section 1983 as an example). On the one hand, some would 
reject dubious interpretation (at least as a textual matter) as a reason for the judiciary to move 
away from prior decisions establishing the meaning of common-law statutes because even 
“[t]extualists concede that text is not controlling” here. Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive 
Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are “Common-Law Statutes” Different?, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 89–106, 89 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 
2013). On the other hand, common-law statutes are said to license courts to employ a “relaxed” 
form of stare decisis by allowing them to “rescind[]” decisions “that over time prove unworkable 
or inconsistent with general policy.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 
76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1377 (1988). 
 393. See, e.g., Duke Law Faculty React to Landmark Supreme Court Decision in Bostock v. 
Clayton County, Ga., DUKE LAW (June 17, 2020), https://law.duke.edu/news/duke-law-faculty-
react-landmark-supreme-court-decision-bostock-v-clayton-county-ga/ [https://perma .cc/ZJ7F-
U24H] (quoting Professor Trina Jones as stating that “[t]his is an extraordinarily wonderful—and 
somewhat surprising—outcome” and reporting that “there was widespread surprise that Justice 
Gorsuch not only joined his liberal colleagues, but wrote the opinion”). 
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caselaw in any context, the Roberts Court, building on the work of the 
Rehnquist Court,394 has fortified and forwarded states’ immunity 
protections with hardly a look back.395 The Court’s recent decisions, 
moreover, have displayed a similar trend favoring government 
defendants on a range of civil rights questions.396 
Nevertheless, encouraging the legal community to reconsider Section 
1983’s nonabrogation of sovereign immunity holds relevance not only 
for the unlikely prospect of judicial change, but also for the possibility of 
legislative reform. For just as “[e]xposing the Court’s choices lets us 
make a clearer and more responsible decision about whether those 
choices are the right ones or whether, having given us such a categorical 
immunity doctrine, the Court should now take some of it back,”397 
exposing the Court’s choices can also highlight the desirability of 
legislative intervention. 
Fully exploring the critical questions concerning the normative value 
of state sovereign immunity in the current constitutional-tort system lies 
beyond the scope of the present project. But introducing the conditions 
confronting congresspeople and sketching a possible path forward helps 
lay the foundation for follow-on work where I address the possibility of 
political reform in greater detail.398 
A.  The Policy Landscape 
Over time, various commentators have advocated the availability of 
entity accountability for constitutional torts.399 As now-Judge Nina 
 
 394. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (declaring that “the States retain 
immunity from private suit in their own courts”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
72–73 (1996) (declaring that “Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations 
placed upon federal jurisdiction” under the Eleventh Amendment). 
 395. See, e.g., Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020) (concluding that “Article I’s 
Intellectual Property Clause [can]not provide the basis for an abrogation of sovereign immunity” 
and that “Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment [can]not support an abrogation on a legislative 
record like the one here”); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019) (“This 
case . . . requires us to decide whether the Constitution permits a State to be sued by a private 
party without its consent in the courts of a different State. We hold that it does not . . . .”). 
 396. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1863 (2017) (holding that “the Court of 
Appeals erred by allowing respondents’ detention policy claims to proceed under Bivens,” which 
provides a mechanism for suing federal officials for certain constitutional violations); id. at 1869 
(“Petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985(3).”). There are, however, some deviations from this trend. See Katherine Mims Crocker, 
The Supreme Court’s Reticent Qualified Immunity Retreat, 71 DUKE L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming 
2021). 
 397. Baude, supra note 236, at 78 (discussing qualified immunity). 
 398.  See Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity, Sovereign Immunity, and Systemic 
Reform, 71 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3796337. 
 399. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 237, at 100–21. 
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Pillard has observed, “A range of rationales can be cited for government 
liability.”400 In addition to agency-level deterrence arguments, for 
instance, the fact that “constitutional violations require state action” 
means that “the government that made an abuse of its official power 
possible should arguably be held accountable for that abuse.”401 There 
are compelling reasons to believe that states almost always indemnify 
their employees—who are already subject to Section 1983 actions for 
damages under Monroe—from constitutional-tort litigation costs and 
judgments.402 And in the event that “individual officials are judgment-
proof” and complete indemnification is unavailable, “only governmental 
liability can provide full compensation.”403 What is more, while local 
governments can be made to answer in damages for some 
unconstitutional acts, state governments can facilitate unlawful conduct 
to the same extent without direct monetary consequences.404 And these 
are only a sampling of the reasons why state-government liability in 
Section 1983 suits could make good sense.  
Until very recently, however, both commentators and policymakers 
seemed to have resigned themselves to viewing sovereign immunity as a 
permanent part of constitutional enforcement. In 1999, Judge Pillard 
noted that while the period between 1973 and 1985 saw twenty-one bills 
“introduced in Congress seeking to replace individual liability” for 
constitutional violations by federal officials “with direct governmental 
liability,” no such bill “ha[d] been introduced since.”405 A decade later, 
Aziz Huq declared the constitutional-tort regime “stable,” noting that “it 
is hardly clear how the diffuse class of possible constitutional tort 
plaintiffs could overcome evident transaction costs to collective actions 
to seek legislated change.”406 
Things are shifting. Spurred by the murder of George Floyd and 
countless other acts of police violence captured on cellphone video and 
 
 400. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ 
Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 74 (1999). 
 401. Id. at 75. 
 402. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) 
(focusing on law enforcement officers). 
 403. Pillard, supra note 400, at 75. 
 404. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (holding that local 
governments are not wholly immune from suit under § 1983). It stands to reason that more 
constitutional violations happen under local control than under state control. But state officials 
are still regularly accused of violating people’s constitutional rights, including in the police use-
of-force context on which the discussion below focuses. See, e.g., Hannah Knowles, Body-Cam 
Video Shows Louisiana Troopers Stunned, Hit and Dragged Black Man Before His Death, WASH. 
POST, May 20, 2021, 12:33 PM, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/05/20/ronald-
greene-louisiana-police-video/ [https://perma.cc/5YDD-42TJ]. 
 405. Pillard, supra note 400, at 98. 
 406. Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 261 
& n.157. 
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echoed around the Internet, “collective actions to seek legislated change” 
have been gathering steam. And congresspeople have been responding, 
with multiple bills and resolutions aimed at altering constitutional-tort 
law proposed over the last couple years. So far, these legislative efforts 
have largely focused on revising or rejecting qualified immunity,407 
which shields police officers and other government officials sued for 
violating federal constitutional rights from having to pay money damages 
unless their conduct’s unlawfulness was “clearly established” at the time 
it occurred.408 Calls to restrain or reject qualified immunity are well 
founded,409 and other potential reforms (like expanding municipal 
liability) are important as well. But the relative lack of attention to 
sovereign immunity has represented an unfortunate oversight that the 
policy path sketched here could help remedy.410   
B.  A Possible Path Forward 
There are good reasons for Congress to make states suable in damages 
for constitutional-tort claims across the board. But there are also good 
reasons for Congress to start with Fourth Amendment excessive force 
 
 407. See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 102 (2021) 
(as passed by House, Mar. 3, 2021); Ending Qualified Immunity Act, S. 4142, 116th Cong. 
(2020); Reforming Qualified Immunity Act, S. 4036, 116th Cong. (2020); George Floyd Justice 
in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 102 (2020) (as passed by House, June 25, 
2020); Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020); Restoration of Civil 
Rights Act of 2019, H.R. 7115, 116th Cong. (2020); S. Res. 602, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. Res. 
702, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 408. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 409. See Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117 
MICH. L. REV. 1405, 1457–58 (2019). 
 410. The Restoration of Civil Rights Act of 2019 did seek to address state sovereign 
immunity, H.R. 7115, but attracted less notice and support than qualified immunity reform efforts 
did. And recent media reports indicate that Senator Tim Scott is pursuing a compromise on 
qualified immunity that may involve increased entity liability. See Seung Min Kim, Annie 
Linskey, & Marianna Sotomayor, Chauvin Verdict Injects a Fresh Jolt of Momentum into Police 
Overhaul Efforts, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2021, 7:58 PM, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/chauvin-verdict-police-overhaul/2021/04/21/fa47d65c-a2a0-11eb-85fc-06664ff4489d_
story.html [https://perma.cc/UU2K-HLHW] (“Republicans have especially balked at dumping the 
‘qualified immunity’ standard, which they say allows police officers to do their job without the 
threat of potentially frivolous lawsuits. Scott said Wednesday one potential compromise is holding 
liable police departments, rather than individual officers.”). The details remain sketchy, however, 
and it is not clear that state-government liability—as opposed to only local-government liability—
is on the table. See Manu Raju, Jessica Dean, & Ted Barrett, GOP Senator Floats Compromise 
on Policing Legislation as Bipartisan Talks Pick Up Pace, CNN, Apr. 21, 2021, 6:20 PM, 
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/21/politics/policing-reform-talks-congress-latest-
negotiations/index.html [https://perma.cc/NY5Q-EREK] (“‘We need the individual officers and 
the agencies to be accountable,’ [Representative Karen] Bass said after talking on the Senate floor 
with key Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee. ‘Because I think if the agencies, the 
cities, if they’re concerned about lawsuits, they will not want to have problem officers.’”). 
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claims while keeping an eye toward gradually removing sovereign 
immunity protections for other constitutional violations in the future. 
1.  Focusing on Excessive Force 
Excessive force is neither the only kind of government conduct nor 
the only kind of constitutional violation that calls out for deep and wide 
reform. But excessive force is of paramount importance in the present 
moment. Evidence indicates that law enforcement officers use deadly 
force with alarming frequency and that they use it against different racial 
groups with alarming asymmetry.411 It is no surprise, therefore, that 
police violence, especially toward communities of color, has spurred the 
protests that have pushed the nation into an extended period of collective 
soul-searching.   
On a community level, rooting out unjustified uses of force is essential 
to improving relationships between law enforcement agencies and the 
citizens they serve, particularly in localities facing years of abuse.412 On 
an individual level, physical violence implicates a person’s constitutional 
interest in bodily integrity in an elemental way.413 Policymakers can no 
longer overlook how current practices reflect a “history of state over-
policing and brutalization of Black bodies dating back to slavery and 
Reconstruction” and continue to produce injuries that are uniquely 
harmful in collective and personal senses alike.414 Excessive force claims 
are, therefore, an obvious starting point for any project seeking to 
increase accountability for constitutional wrongs. 
  
 
 411. See Lynne Peeples, Brutality and Racial Bias: What the Data Say, 583 NATURE, July 2, 
2020, at 22–23 (discussing the available data and stating as follows: “About 1,000 civilians are 
killed each year by law-enforcement officers in the United States. By one estimate, Black men are 
2.5 times more likely than white men to be killed by police during their lifetime. And in another 
study, Black people who were fatally shot by police seemed to be twice as likely as white people 
to be unarmed.”). 
 412. See Debo P. Adegbile, Policing Through an American Prism, 126 YALE L.J. 2222, 
2225–27 (2017). 
 413. The Supreme Court has repeatedly focused on bodily integrity in the search side of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Missouri v. McNeely, for instance, the Court recognized that 
“an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted 
expectations of privacy.’” 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 
(1985)). And in Schmerber v. California, the Court said that “[t]he integrity of an individual’s 
person is a cherished value of our society.” 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966). 
 414. Erika Wilson, Response, The Great American Dilemma: Law and the Intransigence of 
Racism, 20 CUNY L. REV. 513, 518 (2017); see also Brandon Hasbrouck, Essay, Abolishing 
Racist Policing with the Thirteenth Amendment, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 200, 206 (2020) 
(presenting a historical overview to argue that “[i]n both the North and the South, formal policing 
in America has racist roots”). 
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2.  Taking a Gradual Approach 
From a political perspective, proceeding in a gradual fashion should 
prove more successful than seeking rapid change. Problems of police 
violence underlie the current legislative interest in constitutional-tort law, 
and Congress has thus chosen to concentrate on proposals targeted at 
policing while sidelining legislation aimed at wider-ranging concerns.  
On June 4, 2020, for instance, Representatives Justin Amash and 
Ayanna Pressley introduced the Ending Qualified Immunity Act, which 
would have abolished qualified immunity from Section 1983 suits for any 
and all officials.415 Less than a week later, Representative Karen Bass 
introduced the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020,416 the 
primary Democratic proposal responding to Floyd’s killing and the 
ensuing unrest. Among other measures, this bill would have ended 
qualified immunity in Section 1983 suits for “investigative” and “law 
enforcement” officials only.417 While no proposal cutting back on 
qualified immunity was expected to advance in the Senate last year 
because of Republican opposition,418 the latter bill fared far better than 
the former one did. The Ending Qualified Immunity Act drew only a few 
dozen co-sponsors and never made it out of committee.419 The George 
Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020 garnered more than 200 co-
sponsors and passed the full House.420 Critically, the George Floyd 
Justice in Policing Act of 2021 has also passed the House and has 
momentum heading into the Senate.421 
Of course, any attempt to establish government liability for 
constitutional torts would generate pushback, especially in today’s 
exceptionally polarized political climate. But President Joe Biden has 
signaled a desire to prioritize police reform, including by endorsing the 
 
 415. Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020). 
 416. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. § 102 (2020) (as 
passed by House, June 25, 2020). 
 417. Id. 
 418. See Jamie Ehrlich, Democrats Team for Effort to End Doctrine Shielding Police as GOP 
Backs Off, CNN (July 1, 2020, 9:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/01/politics/qualified-
immunity-senate-markey-warren-sanders/index.html [https://perma.cc/NF8G-C4P5]. 
 419. H.R.7085 – Ending Qualified Immunity Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7085?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22hr
7085%22%5D%7D&r=1&s=3 [https://perma.cc/P8R7-Y9Q7]. 




 421.  See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 102 (2021) 
(as passed by House, Mar. 3, 2021); Kim, Linskey, & Sotomayor, supra note 410; Raju, Dean, & 
Barrett, supra note 410. Representative Pressley recently reintroduced the Ending Qualified 
Immunity Act, but it remains in committee. See Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 1470, 117th 
Cong. (2021). 
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George Floyd Justice in Policing Act.422 And Senator Tim Scott, a 
Republican, has worked hard with colleagues to try to forge bipartisan 
compromise in this Democratic-dominated area.423 At the least, pursuing 
a piecemeal approach should lower the amplitude of some arguments 
against broad-based interventions. And it could allow Congress to use 
early measures as case studies to fine-tune and effectuate further-reaching 
changes in the future. 
Admittedly, this brief sketch of the policy landscape and a potential 
path through it provokes questions to a greater degree than it provides 
answers. How would state-government liability affect the public fisc? Or 
the volume of constitutional-tort litigation? Would increasing the scope 
of constitutional remedies paradoxically encourage courts to decrease the 
scope of substantive rights? And what about the federal government: 
should it also face damages judgments for violating people’s 
constitutional protections? What standard should govern the imposition 
of government liability, anyway, especially since the Supreme Court has 
long rejected a respondeat superior model for municipalities sued under 
Section 1983?424 
These questions, along with any number of related inquiries, are 
enormously important. They all emerge at the intersection of myriad legal 
doctrines and practices, implicating a constellation of concerns that 
scholars often discuss under the rubric of “remedial equilibration.”425 
With the discussion here setting the stage, forthcoming work of mine 
offers a fuller look at fundamental issues like these.426 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has reconsidered Section 1983’s nonabrogation of 
sovereign immunity from multiple standpoints. Proceeding from a 
negative perspective, the analysis has shown how the Supreme Court’s 
caselaw rests on dubious interpretive decisions and historical 
assumptions. Adopting a more affirmative approach, the analysis has also 
 
 422. Catie Edmondson & Nicholas Fandos, Buoyed by Floyd Verdict, Congress Eyes New 
Bid to Overhaul Policing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/21/ 
us/politics/congress-police-reform.html [https://perma.cc/SXP5-XAMX]. 
 423. See id.; see also supra note 410. 
 424.  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that “Congress 
did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy 
of some nature caused a constitutional tort” and that “[i]n particular, . . . a municipality cannot be 
held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be 
held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory”). 
 425. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 857, 858 (1999) (describing remedial equilibration as the theory that “rights and remedies 
are inextricably intertwined,” with rights “dependent on remedies not just for their application to 
the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence”). 
 426. See Crocker, supra note 398. 
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offered evidence in favor of reading Section 1983 to allow civil actions 
against states, while carefully considering counterevidence too. The 
upshot is that the case for state suability is stronger than the Court or 
previous commentary has credited. Lastly, this Article connected this 
backward-looking discussion to the possibility of forward-looking 
improvement of the American constitutional-tort system, especially in 
relation to the present movement for racial justice and police reform.  
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